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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
We form impressions of other people on a daily basis. For example, when we 
know that a man goes out on a date with a beautiful woman and gives her flowers, we 
think the man is considerate. When we hear that a person offers to carry some books 
down the hall, we think the person is helpful. When we see that a woman gives away 
vegetables from her own garden to her neighbor, we think she is generous. Perceivers 
readily attribute behavior to personality traits without much thought (Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995). 
 People are concerned with why a person behaves in a certain way. When 
forming an impression of other people, a fundamental distinction between 
dispositional and situational causes can be made (Heider, 1944, 1958; Jones & Davis, 
1965; Jones & Harris, 1967; Kelley, 1967, 1973). This means that not only a 
dispositional, personal explanation can be inferred from behavior, but that also a 
situational explanation may be inferred: For example, the man gives flowers on a date, 
because the flowers are very cheap. The person who offers to carry books knows that 
the books are very light. And the woman gives away vegetables because it is too 
much to eat it all by herself. 
 Although both dispositional and situational inferences can be made 
effortlessly, in general, perceivers underestimate the situational influence on behavior. 
When we observe a behavior, we are generally inclined to ascribe it to someone’s 
personality and not to the situation (Jones & Harris, 1967). This tendency for 
perceivers to conclude that a person has a disposition that corresponds to his or her 
behavior even when the behavior is attributable to the situation is called the 
correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1990) and is a very robust and 
pervasive finding (see also the fundamental attribution error: Ross, 1977). As a result 
of the correspondence bias, perceivers thoughtlessly assume that actors’ behaviors and 
statements mirror their dispositions. This is true, even when the observed behavior is 
highly constrained by situational factors (Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Ross & Nisbett, 
1991). For instance, in the classic Fidel Castro experiment (cf., Jones & Harris, 1967), 
for some participants the position taken in an essay the author wrote was freely 
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chosen (to be in favor of, or against Fidel Castro’s regime) whereas for other 
participants the experimenter assigned the position to the author. Perceivers, who read 
the essay advocating a position in favor of Fidel Castro’s regime, inferred that the 
author of the essay endorses this position, regardless of whether the author freely 
chose to write the essay or had no choice. Both under conditions of free-choice and 
constraint, perceivers showed a tendency to infer a positive attitude towards Fidel 
Castro’s regime, even when it is explained that the constrained author had no choice 
which essay to write because he or she was assigned the position. In fact, it is highly 
possible that the author in the assigned, constrained condition strongly opposes Fidel 
Castro, but thinks that a good writer is able to create a convincing essay, even if the 
position is not what he or she personally endorses. Not only in experiments, but also 
in real life the correspondence bias can be found: In a study from Schoeneman and 
Rubanowitz (1985) an analysis of “Dear Abby” letters appearing in newspaper advise 
columns revealed that people seeking advice explained the behavior of others in 
dispositional terms. 
 The general view in the trait inference field is that behavior tends to be taken 
at face value. However, there is some evidence that suggests that perceivers refrain 
from making dispositional attributions when they learn information that provides 
them with reason to suspect the motives of an actor (Jones, Davis & Gergen, 1961; 
Reeder & Brewer, 1979). The possibility of ulterior motives may work as an antidote 
to the correspondence bias (Fein, 1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Hilton, Fein, & 
Miller, 1993) because perceivers are more inclined to apply a situational cause for the 
behavior (Gawronski, 2004). When someone is aware that there may be an ulterior 
motive or hidden agenda, the perceiver is ambiguous about the true motives and 
therefore withholds his or her trait attribution (Fein, 1996). In the examples mentioned 
earlier, ulterior motives can be present when the man goes out on a date with the boss’ 
daughter and gives her flowers, when the person offers to carry books down the hall 
for the professor who grades the exam, and when the woman gives away vegetables 
and subsequently asks her neighbor to watch her kids after school.1 
 
The Present Thesis 
In society, there is a common assumption that people should be honest. 
Already as children we are taught about the importance of honesty: We tell the truth 
because it is the right thing to do. Being honest can thus be seen as the societal default 
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position: People assume that, when others tell them something, they tell the truth. 
Indeed, deception is highly disapproved of and flattery for ulterior motives (as a form 
of lying) is considered socially undesirable. However, being flattered can also be very 
rewarding, because it makes one feel good, even if the flattery is for ulterior motives. 
Thus there is a discrepancy between feeling good by accepting the flattery at face 
value, and wanting to avoid being fooled. This discrepancy is also important in 
information search. On the one hand, people who are flattered uncritically accept what 
others are saying, because it feels good and they do not want to know it if the flattery 
is not meant. So, they do not search for information indicating the flatterer is 
dishonest. On the other hand, people want to know whether the flattery is not sincere, 
because they want to avoid being duped. 
In the current thesis we investigate the impression people form of someone 
with an ulterior motive. What sort of information do they request about the other 
person and how does this information subsequently alter their impression? As yet, it 
has never been investigated what kind of information perceivers request when they 
are aware of the possibility of ulterior motives. The question is whether ulterior 
motives are detected at all and whether targets (the person whom the flattery is aimed 
at) and observers (perceivers of flattery) differ in implementing the information 
regarding ulterior motives. First, we investigate what perceivers want to know about 
the other person (Chapters 1, 2, and 3), then, they receive the requested information 
and we look at impression formation (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). We conduct research 
among targets and observers to take into account the tension between being flattered 
and knowing the truth (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). 
In general, forming an impression about other persons is seen in light of 
Kelley’s covariance model (Kelley, 1967). However, we were more specifically 
interested in person perception when ulterior motives are involved. To examine what 
sort of information people request when ulterior motives are involved we conducted a 
pretest in which students at the Radboud University Nijmegen participated. We used a 
booklet with several different short descriptions (among others the three 
aforementioned). It was explicitly mentioned that there are two possible explanations 
for the behavior in the description and that they could ask questions to determine 
which one is true: “A student offers to carry some books down the hall for the 
professor. It is possible that the student is helpful. It is also possible that the student 
wants to butter up the professor. What do you want to know to determine this?” Two 
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coders independently of each other categorized the questions participants wrote down. 
If the two coders disagreed about a question they discussed the difference of opinion 
until they reached consensus (this happened in less than 1 % of the total number of 
cases). The coding data revealed that perceivers mainly asked questions about the 
actor (more than half of the questions were about the actor), some questions were 
about the actor-target relationship (e.g., dependence related questions, such as “Does 
the student take a class from the professor?”), some were about the target (e.g., “Is the 
professor a friendly man?”), and only a few were about other circumstances (e.g., 
whether the wife pampered her husband because it was their wedding anniversary). 
More specifically, most questions were about the actor’s consistency (e.g., “Does she 
always behave this way towards her husband, preparing a nice dinner etc.?”); some 
about the behavior’s distinctiveness (e.g., “Would he also help a man with car 
trouble?”); and there were also some consensus related questions (e.g., “Do other 
students help the professor?”); cf., Kelley’s covariance model, 1967. Less than 18 % 
of the questions that were written down were negative in nature (e.g., “Will people be 
laid off/ fired soon?”), the rest of them were positive (e.g., “Is the wife always 
friendly towards her husband?”) or neutral (“What does the student do for a study?”); 
suggesting that people may be reluctant to discover ulterior motives. 
 Since it is vital for survival to know whether one is duped or not, we 
investigate whether the information people requested in the pretest is sufficient to 
determine whether someone has ulterior motives when these motives are not explicitly 
mentioned. We begin by providing perceivers with only moderately informative cues, 
because this is even stronger evidence, if it suffices. In sum, we aim to investigate 
whether perceivers are able to detect ulterior motives at all; and, if they do, how this 
process evolves from beginning till end. At the same time, we investigate how the 
information changes their evaluation of the actor (Chapter 2). 
 However, we are not all uninvolved observers. Sometimes, we are the targets 
of someone with an ulterior motive. For instance, when someone pays you a 
compliment and then later asks if you can do him or her a favor. You are not just 
observing the flattery; you are the person whom the flattery is aimed at. For targets, 
other processes may be at hand when discovering ulterior motives than for observers. 
People who are being flattered generally like the flatterer and think he or she is more 
sincere than when they are only observing the flattering behavior (Gordon, 1996). 
This so-called target-observer difference is assumed to be caused by targets’ 
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motivation to be flattered (Jones, 1990; Jones, Stires, Shaver, & Harris, 1968; Vonk, 
2002). Surprisingly, this difference has never been the topic of interest in research on 
information search. We include targets in our studies to extend previous research on 
ulterior motives by examining what kind of personality information targets request 
when they have the opportunity (Chapter 3). Do targets and observers differ in their 
information search about a flattering actor? For targets it can be beneficial to 
uncritically accept the flattery, whereas observers are expected to be more suspicious. 
People look for information that confirms their initial impression which may result in 
different types of information search for targets and observers. Next, we investigate 
how the requested information subsequently changes the impression targets and 
observers have about the actor. For instance, do targets persevere in the more positive 
impression or are they quite sensitive to the personality information indicating ulterior 
motives? 
 To further take into account the tension between being flattered and knowing 
the truth, we compare targets and observers in their implementation of information 
(Chapter 4). We investigate whether targets persevere in the more positive impression 
when they receive information regarding the actor’s distinctiveness (information they 
requested in our pilot study, see also Kelley, 1967). It can be beneficial for targets’ 
wellbeing to hold a positive view of the flatterer. Or, are targets nevertheless willing 
to implement additional information about the actor’s insincerity, because they do not 
want to be fooled? We use open responses to be able to compare targets and 
observers. Finally, we investigate whether targets like a flattering actor who has an 
ulterior motive, regardless of the content of the flattery. Can we say anything when 
we want to influence someone as long as it is positive or does it matter what is being 
said? Is it sufficient being positive or does flattery have to be accurate (Swann, 1997)? 
Is it important that the flattery is descriptively consistent with targets’ self-view 
(Chapter 5)? 
 It is important to note that, in our studies, we are mainly interested in 
participants’ impression regarding the traits “likeable,” “sincere,” and “slimy,” 
because we expect these traits to be of interest when ulterior motives are involved. 
Already in 1968, Anderson conducted a study in which people rated the desirability of 
555 traits; sincere received the highest value. This clearly indicates that people find 
sincerity one of the most valued traits we have. It is also one of the traits most valued 
in a desired mate (Toro-Morn & Sprecher, 2003). More recently, a survey in the 
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CentERpanel was conducted (a representative sample of the Dutch population) in 
which the respondents were asked what they thought is “the most positive personality 
trait” (Marchand, unpublished data, 2006). The results were clear: In their open 
responses more than 36% of the respondents used sincere (or a synonym such as 
honest) as the most positive personality trait. Friendly (likeable) came second (11%). 
Thus, knowing whether someone is sincere or is only behaving in a positive way 
because of an ulterior motive is important to people. People want to know what others 
are like. In addition to the traits likeable and sincere we are also interested in the trait 
“slimy”. This trait is frequently used to describe flattery, overly friendly behavior, and 
brownnosing, and therefore relevant as a dependent variable in research about ulterior 
motives. Since likeability and sliminess need not correlate it is important to 
investigate both traits. Moreover, in research in which an experimenter gave 
participants a compliment about their appearance without having an ulterior motive 
(Marchand, unpublished data), targets rated the experimenter as more likeable than 
observers; however, we found no effect for ratings on insincere, and slimy. This 
suggests that flattery is only related to insincerity, sliminess, and less liking when 
ulterior motives are involved. Since in this thesis the focus is on ulterior motives and 
these hidden agendas are always present, we focus on ratings for liking, sincerity, and 
sliminess. Nevertheless, in some chapters, we also include measures such as 
participants’ thoughts, mood, reading times, and behavior. 
 Finally, in Chapter 6, I will give an overview of the findings, discuss 
limitations of our research, and give suggestions for future research. 
 Below I give a summary of the method and hypotheses of each of the 
empirical chapters. These chapters are all based on papers accepted or submitted for 
publication and can therefore be read independently from the rest of the dissertation. 
At the same time, this implies that parts of the introductions may have some overlap. 
 
Chapter 2: The Process of Becoming Suspicious of Ulterior Motives 
In Chapter 2, we want to investigate how the process of becoming suspicious 
of ulterior motives evolves for perceivers. To record the entire process, we first 
provide participants with a positive behavior (e.g., taking a colleague with car trouble 
to the garage). Then, they receive little pieces of information (cues) that reveal the 
actor has an ulterior motive. All the cues are based on a pilot study and are moderately 
informative about the actor or about the target. Participants read each cue aloud and 
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after each cue they elaborate upon that information (cf., Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). We 
hypothesize that participants first draw a correspondent inference (e.g., helpful) after 
which the general impression gradually becomes less positive. Further, we 
hypothesize that suspicion of the ulterior motive first increases, and then decreases, 
until finally, they are certain that the actor is insincere. In short, we expect a linear 
effect for general impression and a quadratic effect for suspicion.  
 
Chapter 3: Motivated by Vanity, not Insanity: Target-Observer Differences in 
Information Search and Impression Revision after Ingratiation 
Chapter 3 is divided in two parts. In the first part (3A), we provide participants 
the opportunity to ask for personality information about a flattering actor. We use 
Skov & Sherman’s method (1986) from the hypothesis testing literature to investigate 
whether targets and observers differ in the information they select. Participants can 
choose between different personality traits that vary in the degree to which they are 
typical of a “sincere” or “slimy” person. We hypothesize that targets and observers 
are differently motivated when they seek additional information, because targets’ ego 
is at stake and they want the actor to be sincere (to determine this, we include a self-
esteem measure), whereas observers’ ego is not at stake. We expect that targets test 
the hypothesis the actor is sincere. In contrast, observers may be more cynical, and in 
comparison with targets they may be more likely to acquire information indicating 
that the actor is insincere and ingratiating. Observers, who are suspicious, are holding 
multiple, rival hypotheses about the actor’s motives (Fein, 1996), so they may not 
have a preference for either type of information because both hypotheses are equally 
likely for the suspicious perceiver. In the second part (3B), participants actually 
receive the information they request (half of them receive positive information, half of 
them negative) and we examine how this changes their impression. Although it is 
possible that targets are motivated to ignore evidence that the flatterer is insincere, we 
hypothesize that both targets and observers are willing to implement the information. 
 
Chapter 4: I Bet You Say That to All the Girls (Boys): When Flattery does not Work 
In Chapter 4, targets and observers participate in an alleged dating situation 
and receive a flattering response to either their own or a third person’s dating profile 
respectively (T1). Subsequently, they find out the actor says almost the same things to 
someone else (distinctiveness information). We expect to replicate the target-observer 
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difference at T1: Targets will judge the actor as more likeable, sincere, and less slimy 
than observers. At T2, we hypothesize this difference disappears. We also measure 
participants’ mood, their reading times, and code their thoughts.   
 
Chapter 5: When Flattery does not Work: the Importance of Descriptive Consistency 
In this final empirical chapter, we want to investigate whether targets 
persevere in their positive impression, even when the flattery is descriptively not 
consistent with their self-view. Are targets charmed by the fact that someone views 
them as important or interesting enough to flatter, even when it is not in accordance 
with their self-view, or do they realize the flattery is not really meant by the actor and 
acknowledge the ulterior motive? Can targets’ positive impression disappear 
immediately; i.e., without providing them with additional information revealing the 
insincerity of a flatterer? In a pretest, we select participants who view themselves as 
theoretical and later provide them with positive feedback about theoretical or practical 
qualities. This way, participants receive concrete feedback, which is consistent or 
inconsistent with the self, but that is still very positive in nature. We hypothesize that 
targets who receive self-consistent flattery judge the actor as more likeable, sincere, 
and less slimy, and feel better, than targets who receive self-inconsistent flattery. 
 
Endnote 
1
 Of course, several different ulterior motives are possible, such as that the 
professor is a very beautiful woman and the student wants to go out with her. We 
provide only one possible ulterior motive. 
  
Chapter 2 
The Process of Becoming Suspicious of Ulterior Motives* 
 
There is ample evidence that most people can not distinguish honest from 
deceptive behavior of others (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999; 
DePaulo & Friedman, 1998; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Malone & DePaulo, 2001). 
One of the reasons why people are so poor at detecting deception is a pervasive 
truthfulness bias: People tend to accept everything they see at face value. Gilbert, 
Tafarodi, and Malone (1993) proposed that people cannot comprehend something 
without accepting it as true (cf., Gilbert, 1991). People do have the power to assent, 
reject, and to suspend their judgment, but only after they have initially believed the 
information to which they have been exposed. Gilbert, Tafarodi, and Malone (1993) 
provided evidence that “… belief is first, easy, and inexorable and that doubt is 
retroactive, difficult, and only occasionally successful” (p. 231). As a consequence, 
most people tend to judge others as truthful most of the time (O’Sullivan, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1988; Zuckerman, Fischer, Osmun, & Winkler, 1987; Zuckerman, Koestner, 
Colella, & Alton, 1984). 
 Related research on attribution suggests that a disposition is often directly 
inferred from behavior, whereas the role of other variables (such as the situation) is 
underestimated or ignored by perceivers (known as  the correspondence bias or 
fundamental attribution error; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). This 
very robust phenomenon, again, reflects the tendency to take behavior at face value. 
More recent research by O’Sullivan (2003) suggests that the fundamental attribution 
error significantly undermines the ability to detect honesty and deception accurately. 
She found evidence that when observers thought positively about someone, they also 
tended to believe the other person was telling the truth even when the person was 
lying. Overcoming this robust effect appears to be difficult both in attribution 
research and deception detection: “The tendency to judge other people on the basis of 
enduring traits, rather than situational relevant states, is one of the reasons most lie 
                                                 
*
 This chapter has been published as: Marchand, M. A. G., & Vonk, R. (2005). The process of 
becoming suspicious of ulterior motives. Social Cognition, 23, 242-256.   
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catchers are so inaccurate, and adjusting this cognitive heuristic is not easy” 
(O’Sullivan, 2003; p. 1325). 
 There is one particular circumstance in which the truthfulness bias can be 
overcome, namely, when a perceiver becomes suspicious about a person’s motives 
(Fein, 1996). For example, imagine that you are reading about John who takes a 
colleague with car trouble to the garage. Probably you think of John as a nice, helpful 
man. However, when you learn that the colleague is an attractive woman, that John is 
not very helpful in other situations, and that he has no serious relationship at the 
moment, you might start wondering whether John took her to the garage merely 
because he was interested in her romantically. In this case, ambiguity emerges about 
the actor’s motives; the perceiver does not know whether the behavior should be 
ascribed to a correspondent trait (helpful) or to an ulterior motive (romantically 
interested). 
 Fein (1996) describes suspicion as a state in which perceivers hold multiple, 
rival hypotheses about the motives or sincerity of the actor’s behavior. According to 
Hilton, Fein, and Miller (1993), perceivers in this state suspend their judgment about 
the actor until they have more information about the actor’s motives. If they have to 
give a judgment, their evaluation will be neutral. This was also found in a study 
conducted by Vonk (1999a), in which likeable behaviors enacted towards superiors 
were judged more moderately than towards subordinates, indicating that subjects took 
into account the possibility of ulterior motives (i.e., “brown-nosing”). Further, it 
seems that suspicious perceivers think actively and systematically about why the 
actor behaved as he or she did. This is what Fein calls the attributional mindset 
(1996). Concomitant with this thoughtfulness and moderate judgments, the 
correspondence bias is reduced, because looking beyond face value requires an 
analytical state of mind. 
 In Fein and his colleagues’ studies, suspicion of ulterior motives is 
experimentally induced. Participants receive an incomplete description of a situation, 
putting them in a state of suspicion. Subsequently, additional information is provided 
that can change participants’ judgments in one direction or the other. For example, 
Fein, Hilton, and Miller (1990) had participants read a story about a man who courts 
a wealthy widow. Participants were unwilling to conclude either that he was in love 
with her or that he was after her money; they were not certain which inference to 
make (i.e., they were suspicious). Then they read additional information about the 
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man’s visit to a grocery store, where the clerk gave him too much change. In one 
condition, the man returned the extra money, while in the other condition he kept the 
extra change. Participants who read that the suitor returned the money concluded that 
he truly loved the woman, while the other participants concluded that he was 
motivated by greed. It is important to note that in our view, by this point participants 
cannot be regarded as suspicious anymore. This is because they no longer question 
whether the actor is insincere: They know.1 
 Although it is evident that suspicion about ulterior motives can overcome the 
correspondence bias, it is not clear how the process of suspicion evolves. In the 
studies by Fein and colleagues, participants are either in a state of suspicion (upon 
reading a story about an actor who behaves suspiciously) or out of that state (upon 
receiving subsequent information that corroborates one of the two possible 
inferences). Presumably, however, perceivers often do not instantly become 
suspicious, nor do they instantly abandon suspicion when they receive 
disambiguating information (unless it is extremely diagnostic). In the present study, 
we sought to extend the research by Fein et al. (1990) by examining the entire 
process, from the moment that perceivers have no suspicion at all, through a phase in 
which suspicion emerges, to the moment that they become certain that the actor 
indeed has an ulterior motive. We hypothesized that perceivers become suspicious 
gradually – (as they start questioning a person’s motives) and that they abandon 
suspicion gradually, as more information becomes available that confirms their 
suspicion.  
 In order to record this dynamic process, we first presented participants with a 
description of a positive behavior, so they would have a positive evaluation of the 
actor (for example: taking a colleague with car trouble to the garage). Then 
participants received small pieces of additional information (cues) that imply that the 
actor might have an ulterior motive (e.g., the colleague is a woman; the colleague is 
attractive). We asked participants to think out loud after each cue (cf., Greenwald, 
1968; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), and we coded their thoughts on 2 dimensions, 
evaluation and suspicion. 
 Our hypotheses are that participants’ general impression of the actor will 
become increasingly negative as more cues are encountered, whereas suspicion will 
first increase and then decrease, as participants become more certain of their 
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judgment and change their initial evaluation (from positive to negative). In short, we 
expect a linear trend for evaluation and a quadratic trend for suspicion. 
 
Study 2.1 
 
Method 
Participants. Forty-nine students of the Radboud University Nijmegen 
participated for a fee of € 1.00 (at the time, about $ 1.10). Two participants were 
discarded, one due to stuttering and one because he did not think aloud the whole 
time. 
 Stimulus materials. In order to safeguard the generalizability of the results, 
we used three different scenarios (presented between participants), which were 
pretested among 59 participants. From the data of this pretest, we also selected ten 
cues per scenario, which were all judged to be moderately informative on a 7-point 
scale. More extreme informative cues were not selected, because one highly 
informative cue could be sufficient to create certainty about ulterior motives. The first 
scenario was: John asks Henrietta to marry him. Examples of cues for this scenario 
include: John likes luxurious products; Henrietta is not very interesting; Henrietta is a 
widow. The mean for the ten cues in this scenario was M = 3.56 (1 = not at all 
informative, 7 = very informative). 
The second scenario was: John takes a colleague with car trouble to the 
garage. Examples of cues for this scenario include: the colleague is a woman; John 
does not have a steady relationship; John offers his colleague compliments about her 
work. The mean informativeness of the ten cues was M = 3.99. 
In the third scenario, the main sentence was: John responds enthusiastically to 
another person’s idea during the meeting. Examples of cues include: the other person 
is higher in rank; John does not have tenure; John will soon have an assessment. The 
mean informativeness for the ten cues used in this scenario was M = 3.91. 
In addition to the specific actor cues, negative general actor cues of John were 
used, for example, John does not offer his seat to the pregnant woman in the bus. This 
type of behavior descriptions in other settings was also used in studies by Fein et al. 
(1990). 
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For each scenario, ten cues were presented. For order variation, these were 
divided into three blocks each containing three (or four) sentences. Each block 
contained one cue (or two) about the target (e.g., the other person is higher in rank), 
one was a negative general actor cue, and one a specific actor cue (e.g., John does not 
have a tenure). Both the order in which the blocks were presented, as well as the 
order of the sentences within each block, were randomized. This way, we ensured 
that no more than two “similar” sentences (e.g., two general actor cues) were 
presented sequentially. Also, in the car trouble scenario, the first cue was always that 
the colleague was a woman, because some other cues, (e.g., the colleague is 
attractive) were ambiguous without this information. In the meeting scenario, the first 
two cues were always that the person with whom John agrees is a man and that the 
man is higher in rank. This was done to prevent redundancy with a later cue, that this 
man is John’s superior.2 
Procedure. Participants sat behind a computer in a cubicle. The 
experimenter sat near them. She told participants that they would participate in a 
study in which they had to think aloud, and that their thoughts would be recorded 
with a tape recorder. The participants then read an instruction on the computer screen, 
in which it was explained that they had to form an impression of John and that they 
had to express their thoughts aloud. They were asked to click “ok” in order to receive 
the scenario sentence (for example, John asks Henrietta to marry him), which had to 
be read aloud immediately, after which they started thinking aloud. In the same way 
participants clicked “ok” for every next cue, read it aloud, and expressed their 
thoughts. 
   Thoughts after each cue were rated for evaluation of the actor (ranging from -
2 = negative to +2 = positive) and for how suspicious the participant was. Both scores 
were based upon all thoughts as a whole. A suspicion score of 3 was given for 
maximum suspicion, i.e., at least two possible motives for the behavior were 
considered and the participant could not decide between these two. A score of 2 was 
given when the participant did consider two explanations for the behavior, but leaned 
towards one of the two and thought the other less likely. A score of 1 was given when 
the participant was certain, either that the actor was nice/friendly or that he had an 
ulterior motive. Two judges coded the thinking aloud protocols independently of each 
other for half of the participants. The thoughts were coded in their original order, 
because in some cases participants said that a piece of extra information did not 
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change their views; in that case the thought was rated identical to the previous 
thought. The correlations between the scores of both judges were r = .81 for 
evaluation and r = .79 for suspicion. 
 The judges also coded at which particular cue a participant started doubting 
the actor’s motives (r = .87) and at which cue the participant concluded for certain 
that the actor had an ulterior motive (r = .84). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 A MANOVA with cue (0 through 10) as within-subjects factor and scenario 
as between-subjects factor showed that, with regard to evaluation, the expected linear 
trend emerged, F(1, 44) = 147.31, p < .01. Regardless of scenario (interaction F(2, 
44) = 1.35, ns), the actor was judged less positively when more cues were presented. 
The means are shown in Figure 2.1. There was also a significant quadratic trend for 
this variable, F(1, 44) = 91.21, p < .01. This is due to the fact that the evaluation first 
declines rapidly, but later levels off which results in a deviation from the perfect 
linear pattern. 
Figure 2.1. Evaluation for each scenario at cue 0-10 (-2 = negative, +2 = positive) 
in Study 2.1. 
 
 With regard to suspicion we found the expected quadratic trend, F(1, 44) = 
14.14, p < .01. The linear trend was not significant F(1, 44) = 1.95, ns. The means in 
Figure 2.2 indicate that initially, after reading the scenario sentence, the participants 
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were certain of their judgment of the actor, then quickly started doubting that 
judgment; gradually they tended to become less suspicious, until at the end they were 
certain about the motives again. As the figure also indicates, there is an interaction 
effect with scenario F(2, 44) = 12.80, p < .01. It appears that there was no suspicion 
in the marriage proposal scenario. More detailed examination of the thinking aloud 
protocols in this condition suggests that the process often developed so quickly that it 
could not be coded. For example, at the cue that Henrietta is a widow one participant 
immediately said: “Oh, widow, I think she is a rich woman, John himself has a low 
income evidently.” The maximum suspicion score of 3 was never reached here, 
because the participant immediately changed from a positive to a negative image of 
the actor. 
Figure 2.2. Degree of suspicion for each scenario at cue 0-10 (1 = certainty, 3 = 
suspicion) in Study 2.1. 
 
 With regard to the question at which cue suspicion arises, no clear pattern was 
found for the marriage proposal scenario. Many participants (9 out of 12), however, 
became suspicious at the cues “Henrietta is not very interesting” (4 participants) or 
“Henrietta is not very attractive” (5 participants). This means that suspicion emerged 
at varying order positions, because the order of cues was varied. When participants 
first read that Henrietta is not very attractive they expect that John wants to marry her 
because of her inner qualities. When they learn subsequently that she is not very 
interesting, they are certain that there has to be an ulterior motive. Conversely, when 
she is dull participants assume she is attractive. 
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 In the car trouble scenario most participants (12 out of 13) became suspicious 
at the first cue (the colleague is a woman). In the meeting scenario, 17 out of 21 
participants became suspicious at the second cue (the person with whom John agrees 
is higher in rank). This implies that the rapid increase in suspicion in these scenarios 
might be caused by the fact that they always started with fixed cues that happened to 
evoke suspicion in most of the participants (see Figure 2.2). In order to examine this 
possibility we conducted the second study. 
 
Study 2.2 
 
Method 
 In this study we replicated the meeting scenario (John responds 
enthusiastically to another person’s idea during the meeting), but presented all cues in 
random order. The cue “the person with whom John agrees is his superior” was 
removed and the cue “the other person is higher in rank” was not presented at a fixed 
location. In other respects, the method used was the same as in Study 2.1. Thirteen 
participants from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated for a fee of € 1.00. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 The data were coded by the same independent judges.3 The results again 
indicated a linear trend for evaluation, F(1, 12) = 41.15, p < .01. Also, a quadratic 
trend for suspicion emerged, F(1, 12) = 5.97, p < .03, whereas the linear trend was 
not significant, F(1, 12) = 1.65, ns. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the increase of 
suspicion in this study is weaker and more gradual. Thus, the quick increase in the 
first study was probably caused by the fact that a relatively informative cue, that the 
other person is higher in rank (M = 4.75, in pretest, as compared to M = 3.82 for other 
cues), was the second cue for every participant. Presumably, the same applies to the 
car trouble scenario and the cue that the other person is a woman. 
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Figure 2.3. Degree of suspicion for the random meeting scenario at cue 0-9 (1 = 
certainty, 3 = suspicion) in Study 2.2. 
 
General Discussion 
 Extant research suggests that people are not good at detecting insincerity, due 
to the correspondence bias and a more general truthfulness bias (O’Sullivan, 2003). A 
suspicious mindset is a quite effective antidote to these biases (Fein, 1996). The 
present research uniquely showed how this mindset emerges and progresses as more 
information is received. In addition, each study showed that people can be quite ready 
to suspect ulterior motives. Participants read one of three different scenario 
descriptions of an actor who behaved in a positive way, to induce an initially 
favorable correspondent inference. Then they received additional, moderately 
informative cues that evoked suspicion by casting a negative light on the behavior. 
As predicted, thinking-aloud protocols showed the expected linear effect for 
evaluation of the actor. That is, participants evaluated the actor less positively as 
more information was presented. In addition, they also showed the expected quadratic 
effect for suspicion. Perceivers initially certain of their evaluation soon began to 
doubt the actor’s motives (suspicion). As more information was presented, they 
became progressively more certain that the actor indeed had ulterior motives, until 
finally they were certain. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that suspicion is 
a dynamic process that unfolds over time as people grapple with the possibility that 
an actor has ulterior motives, and then become convinced. As more information is 
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processed, the negative opinion of the actor increases, while uncertainty rises and 
then falls. 
 Further, our findings suggest that participants can detect ulterior motives or 
insincerity quite quickly, even though they were presented with cues that were 
moderate in informativeness. The results also indicate that certain cues effectively 
trigger suspicion. Mainly, these cues involve characteristics of the person towards 
whom the behavior is enacted (i.e., target cues or actor-target relationship cues), such 
as “the other person is a woman,” “the other person is higher in rank,” and “the other 
person is not attractive.” In line with Vonk’s (1999a) studies, in which participants 
evaluated an actor’s positive behavior differentially depending on the target’s 
hierarchical position, the largest changes in suspicion and evaluation emerged on the 
basis of target information. By comparison, the general actor cues used by Fein et al. 
(1990) had a minor effect on suspicion in our studies. In only 4 out of 120 instances, 
general actor cues led to suspicion or to certainty that the actor had an ulterior 
motive. The difference between our actor cues and those used by Fein et al. is that 
ours were only informative on a general evaluative dimension and were unrelated to 
the behavior (e.g., in the wealthy widow scenario, offering a seat to a pregnant 
woman only means that the actor is friendly, but is not related to honesty or greed). It 
is possible that the actor cues in Fein’s studies were more disambiguating because 
they were descriptively related to honesty or to the trait dimension under 
consideration (e.g., in the wealthy widow scenario, returning extra change to a clerk 
is related to honesty as well as greed, so this cue helped participants conclude that the 
actor was in love with the widow).  
In general, cues that are specifically related to the characteristic under 
consideration probably evoke greater changes in suspicion. In our studies, these were 
often target cues (e.g., in the wealthy widow scenario: the woman is not very 
interesting). Note that the influential role of target information is at odds with the 
correspondence bias and the tendency to focus on the actor and ignore the behavioral 
field. It is, however, in accord with recent evidence (Ham & Vonk, in preparation) 
that characteristics of the targets of behavior are automatically included in 
spontaneous trait inferences (e.g., helping a colleague activates different traits than 
helping a superior). 
 In our studies, the informativeness of the cues presented was held constant. In 
real life, cues are probably more differentiated in their level of informativeness. 
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Moreover, the cues would not be observed in such a short amount of time. In every 
day life, people learn a few things when they meet a person and they learn something 
new on a different occasion. Although the basic mechanisms should be the same, the 
process of becoming suspicious and then certain may take more time outside of the 
lab. Also, in real life, people not only receive negative information about others, but 
also positive information, which might further slow down the process of suspicion or 
even reverse it.  
In the present studies, the information was presented to participants. In real 
life, when people become suspicious about an actor’s motives, they may themselves 
start to search for relevant information that could disambiguate the behavior, 
although we have evidence that the information they acquire is not the most 
diagnostic (see Chapter 3; Marchand & Vonk, under review b). Nonetheless, future 
research should examine a variety of protocols designed to mirror information 
gathering under more natural conditions. 
In addition, individual differences may affect the speed of the suspicion 
process. For example, people who are high in need for closure (i.e., have a desire to 
reduce ambiguity, Kruglanski, 1989; and tend to be impulsive and form quick 
judgments of others, Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) may tend to think of others as 
primarily either good or bad. If so, participants with a higher need for closure may be 
quicker to jump through the process and conclude that an actor is insincere. Of 
course, they might also be slower to start doubting people if they prefer to retain their 
original, positive evaluation. 
If people are certain about their judgment of an actor, they can no longer be 
described as suspicious, because they are not entertaining multiple, rival hypotheses 
anymore. At that point, by definition, suspicion is over. Interestingly, Fein (1996) has 
shown that when perceivers have been suspicious about an actor’s motives, they are 
less likely to fall prey to the correspondence bias when making subsequent judgments 
about a novel actor. While this might suggest that suspicion continues onward, we 
think this result can be explained by a priming or accessibility effect. That is, once a 
suspicious mindset has been activated, it is more likely to be triggered again in new 
situations. 
It is important to note that the process of suspicion may apply to any situation 
in which a person’s behavior can be guided by multiple motives, thus causing 
perceivers to hold multiple hypotheses, or doubt whether their initial judgment was 
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correct. This may occur, for instance, in persuasion settings (e.g., a salesman claiming 
that this is the best buy ever, or any persuasive message from a biased source, cf., 
Campbell, 1995); deception detection situations (e.g., a woman who finds lipstick on 
her husband’s collar); self-presentational situations (e.g., a person claiming high 
competence in a job interview; Leary, 1995; Vonk, 1999b); and even the detection of 
discrimination, in which case mixed motives are also involved (e.g., a person may be 
rejected for a job either because of sexism or because she is not adequate; Fiske et al. 
1991; Berkvens & Vonk, 2002). Our studies are a first step in mapping the 
challenging and fascinating process of becoming suspicious, in person perception as 
well as other domains. 
 
Endnotes 
1
 According to the definition, suspicion has ended when a perceiver does not 
hold multiple hypotheses anymore, and is confident that the actor was driven by 
ulterior motives. At this point, the actor is no longer a “suspect”, but is “guilty”. This 
does not mean that having been suspicious may not produce subsequent residual 
effects. We will return to this issue in the General Discussion. 
 
2
 The exact randomization scheme is available upon request. 
 
3
 In addition, we asked two student coders, who were uninformed about our 
hypotheses, to rate both evaluation and level of suspicion for the thinking aloud data 
from Studies 2.1 and 2.2. The coders showed acceptable agreement (all rs > .60, ps < 
.01). For the first three scenarios from Study 2.1, the analyses of the data produced by 
these judges showed the same patterns; a linear trend for evaluation F(1, 32) = 79.64, 
p < .01 and a quadratic trend for suspicion F(1, 32) = 5.51, p = .03. For the random 
meeting scenario from Study 2.2, the results also replicate the patterns found earlier; a 
linear trend for evaluation F(1, 12) = 21.63, p < .01 and a quadratic trend for 
suspicion F(1, 12) = 6.48, p < .03. 
  
Chapter 3 
Motivated by Vanity, Not Insanity: 
Target-Observer Differences in Information Search and Impression 
Revision after Ingratiation* 
 
Imagine you are the supervisor in a corporation and you meet a new subordinate 
who expresses his enthusiasm about working with you in your company. You may 
assume the subordinate is so excited because he has heard only good things about you 
as a supervisor and wants to express his admiration. However, another subordinate, who 
walks by and observes the new colleague’s enthusiasm, may conclude the colleague 
simply knows that it is very difficult to get promoted and has decided to start his career 
by flattering the boss.  
 In our daily lives, there are many examples of hidden agendas, or ulterior 
motives. Although we all know it is possible that somebody is not sincere when he or 
she is complimenting us, people generally like those who flatter them. Gordon (1996) 
found that people form more favorable impressions of an ingratiator when the 
ingratiation is directed toward them than when they are uninvolved observers. This 
target-observer difference (Vonk, 2002) is a very robust effect, caused by the target’s 
motivation to be flattered. When people are the target of ingratiation, their self-esteem is 
served by accepting the flattery uncritically; on the other hand, when they are observers, 
their ego is not at stake and they may examine the actor’s behavior with more scrutiny. 
In the example above, the supervisor probably forms a more favorable impression of the 
employee than the observer, who is more suspicious about the actor’s motives. 
 In previous studies on ulterior motives, researchers investigated how 
disambiguating information about an actor influenced observers’ impressions (Fein, 
1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990, 1993), but not how targets’ impressions of the actor 
would be influenced by additional diagnostic information. Furthermore, such 
disambiguating information has always been presented to participants by the researcher, 
whereas in real life people may actively seek information themselves, and they may not 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Marchand, M. A. G., & Vonk, R. (under review b). It is also based on data 
collected by Vonk (2002): Only relevant, new analyses are reported in this chapter. 
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all acquire the same kind of information, depending on their own motives and goals. In 
the present studies, we want to extend previous research on ulterior motives by a) 
examining what kind of information participants themselves acquire when they have the 
opportunity, and b) examining differences between targets and observers in their 
information search as well as the effects of additional information about an ingratiating 
actor. 
 In research on hypothesis testing, it has been examined how observers test 
hypotheses about others’ personality traits, such as the hypothesis that an actor is either 
introverted or extraverted (Snyder & Swann, 1978). Many studies based on this 
hypothesis-testing paradigm have shown that individuals prefer questions about 
behaviors that are consistent with the hypothesized trait as opposed to the alternative 
trait (see e.g., Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990; Evett, Devine, Hirt, & Price, 1994; 
Hodgins & Zuckerman, 1993; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Snyder & Swann, 1978; Swann 
& Giuliano, 1987; for a review of this ‘confirmation bias,’ see Trope & Liberman, 
1996). Thus, people prefer to test their hypothesis by seeking evidence that is consistent 
rather than inconsistent with it (cf., positive test strategy described by Klayman & Ha, 
1987; and Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996). 
 In line with this tendency, we expect that both targets and observers of 
ingratiation seek additional information that is consistent with their hypothesis. 
However, in the present setting, the ingratiating behavior is ambiguous, so due to 
motivational differences targets may test an entirely different hypothesis than observers, 
even though they receive the exact same information. Thus, we expect that targets will 
acquire information indicating that the actor is sincere, because this is consistent with 
their preferred hypothesis that the actor is a likeable, sincere person. In contrast, 
observers may be more cynical, and in comparison with targets they may be more likely 
to acquire information indicating that the actor is insincere and ingratiating. Observers, 
who are suspicious, are holding multiple, rival hypotheses about the actor’s motives 
(Fein, 1996), so they may not have a preference for either type of information because 
both hypotheses are equally likely for the suspicious perceiver. Targets, on the other 
hand, are not truly suspicious because they have a preference for one of the hypotheses. 
As a consequence, they take the actor’s behavior at face value and test the hypothesis 
that the actor is sincere. 
 In sum, we suggest that, in addition to cognitive, expectancy-based biases in 
information search, there are also motivational biases (cf., Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 
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2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kunda, 1990; Vonk, 1998a, 2002). More specifically, 
targets may be inclined to look for certain information, not because they expect it to 
confirm their hypothesis, but because they would like to see it confirmed. To investigate 
whether targets want the actor to be sincere or simply expect this, we included self-
esteem in this study. If targets of ingratiation are motivated by vanity, both high and low 
self-esteem targets will search for information reflecting the actor’s sincerity: Previous 
research shows that even people with low self-esteem are motivated to acquire favorable 
feedback because it makes them feel good (cf., self-enhancement; Swann, 1987, 1990). 
On the other hand, because high self-esteem targets are more likely than low self-esteem 
targets to see the ingratiating description as accurate and sincere, this implies that if 
targets are selecting information on a more cognitive, expectancy-based level, high self-
esteem targets are more likely to select information reflecting sincerity because that 
confirms their hypothesis that the description is accurate, whereas low self-esteem 
targets are more likely to be distrustful and select information indicating that the actor is 
ingratiating. Because observers’ ego is not at stake, their information search is 
independent of their level of self-esteem.   
 To distinguish between sincerity- versus ingratiation-consistent testing, we 
adapted Skov and Sherman’s method (1986). In their study, they created entirely new 
planets to investigate what kind of information participants acquire to test a hypothesis 
about a person. They explained to participants that there were two types of creatures 
living on a faraway planet, and their task was to find out the identity of a creature they 
ostensibly met. For 12 different characteristics, participants received percentages on 
how the characteristics were distributed for each creature; e.g., on the planet Vuma, 10 
% of the Kopis whistle while they work and 50 % of the Jabos whistle while they work. 
Then, participants received instructions to find out whether they had ostensibly met a 
Kopis (or, in another condition a Jabos, or in a third condition a Kopis or a Jabos) and 
were allowed to ask the creature two questions about its characteristics. Participants 
showed a tendency to ask hypothesis-confirming questions: They asked for traits that 
were frequent among Kopis when testing the hypothesis that the creature was a Kopis, 
whereas they asked for traits that were more frequent among Jabos (e.g., do you whistle 
when you work?) when testing the hypothesis that the creature was a Jabos. 
 In the present study, the question is whether the results of the planet Vuma can 
be generalized to the planet Earth, where people often have a motivational stake in the 
matter. We provided target and observer participants with the opportunity to acquire 
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additional information about an ingratiator’s personality. Based on Skov and Sherman’s 
method, the available information was varied with respect to a) the extent to which it 
was indicative of sincerity and b) the extent to which it was indicative of ingratiation. 
This way, sincerity-consistent testing can be examined independently of ingratiation-
consistent testing. For instance, the trait “reliable” is indicative of sincerity, because 
sincere people are expected to possess the trait, whereas it is not indicative of 
ingratiation, because slimy people are not expected to possess it. However, the trait 
“ambitious” shows that a trait can also be indicative of both ingratiation and sincerity: A 
high percentage of ingratiating people are expected to possess this trait, but also many 
sincere people possess it. As another example, “hostile” is expected to occur 
infrequently among both sincere and ingratiating people. 
 Because participants in general are assumed to test the hypothesis that they 
prefer, we expect targets to predominantly request information about traits reflecting 
sincerity and not traits reflecting ingratiation, whereas this difference should not occur 
among observers. Furthermore, if targets are motivated by vanity, their preference for 
traits reflecting sincerity will emerge regardless of their level of self-esteem. On the 
other hand, if targets’ hypothesis-testing strategy is cognitive and expectancy-based, the 
preference for sincerity-consistent traits should emerge only among high self-esteem 
targets. For observers, no effects of self-esteem are expected, so in this case an 
interaction of Condition (target, observer) X Self-Esteem should obtain. 
 
Pretest 
In a pretest, 150 participants rated 30 personality characteristics on how 
indicative of sincerity and ingratiation each characteristic was. Half of the participants 
received instructions to think of a prototypical sincere person and to indicate what 
percentage of sincere people possesses a certain characteristic; e.g., “What percentage 
of sincere people is reliable”? The other half received instructions to think of a typical 
slimy1 person and indicated what percentage of slimy people possesses a certain 
characteristic; e.g., “What percentage of slimy people is reliable”? 
 Based on the mean percentages for each characteristic, we made a selection of 
12 personality traits that fit into different categories for the two traits. These categories 
are shown in Table 3.1. When a trait is categorized as “Low,” this means that, according 
to the participants, 0-39 % of the slimy or sincere people possess this trait. “Middle” 
means that 40-59 % of the slimy or sincere people are perceived to possess this trait, 
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and “High” means 60-100 %. The first category mentioned in the table refers to slimy 
people, the second category to sincere people; thus, a trait categorized as “Low-High” 
means that a small percentage of slimy people are expected to possess the trait and a 
large percentage of sincere people (e.g., reliable). The higher the frequency percentage 
for a trait, the higher is the extent to which the trait is seen as confirming the 
corresponding hypothesis (slimy or sincere). This way, the pretest provided us with 
frequency percentages for real traits, parallel to the “fake” frequencies for Skov and 
Sherman’s imaginary planets. 
 
Table 3.1 
The mean percentages from the pretest for the 12 selected traits and the categories in 
which they are divided 
  % Slimy % Sincere 
Trait Category Trait† M M 
Low-High reliable 22 % 82 % 
Low-High direct 20 % 78 % 
High-Low artificial 84 % 13 % 
High-Low exaggerative 80 % 27 % 
Low-Middle authoritarian 30 % 40 % 
Middle-Low distrustful 55 % 27 % 
High-Middle complimentary 79 % 56 % 
Middle-High positive 38 % 64 % 
Low-Low inhibited 35 % 24 % 
Low-Low hostile 35 % 26 % 
High-High ambitious 81 % 73 % 
High-High looks out for self-interest 76 % 68 % 
†
 Best possible translations from Dutch. 
 
Overview 
Target and observer participants received an ingratiating description about 
themselves or another participant, respectively (Condition), and formed an impression 
of the person who wrote the description (actor). Subsequently, they were given the 
opportunity to request more information about the actor. The information from which 
Chapter 3 32
they could choose varied in how indicative of ingratiation it was and how indicative of 
sincerity it was. Subsequently, the requested information (varying in valence) was 
actually presented to participants, and the actor was rated again. 
For the sake of clarity, we will describe the first stage of the experiment as Study 
3.1A, in which we examine what kind of information participants request, depending on 
Condition and Self-Esteem. Subsequently, the second stage will be described as Study 
3.1B, in which we focus on the effects of the information received on subsequent 
impressions of the actor. 
 
Study 3.1 A 
 
Method 
 Design and participants. The design was a 4 (Experiment number2) X 2 
(Condition) factorial design. Participants were 483 undergraduates with different majors 
(314 women, 169 men). They were paid for participating in this study and an unrelated 
filler study. 
 Procedure and stimulus materials. Participants were recruited to participate in 
a study on how people form impressions of others. Each participant read and signed a 
“confidentiality form” to make it credible that they would later receive information 
about other participants. The experimenter then seated the participants in individual 
cubicles behind a computer. Participants were first asked to type in their first name and 
their gender; it was explained that the names would be used during the experiment, but 
would not be saved. The first part of the study consisted of a Dutch translation of the 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965) and a series of alleged personality tests. Participants 
were told that everyone who participated was taking these tests. The primary goal of 
this part was to convey to participants that a) the flattering description they would later 
read was based on real personality information, and b) we had real test results for the 
traits they could later select from when acquiring information about the actor. 
 After completing the personality tests, participants learned that there would be 
two groups in the study. Participants in one group would see the test responses given by 
another participant (which would be transferred by the computer server to which they 
were connected) and would be asked to write a description of their impression of this 
person. Participants in the other group would get to read one of these descriptions. All 
participants were told that they had been randomly assigned to the latter group, and that 
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they would participate in a different and unrelated study, while the participants in the 
other group looked at the test results of others and wrote a description of their 
impressions. Subsequently, a filler study was conducted. 
 When the experiment resumed, participants were told that they would read one 
of the descriptions made by someone in the other group. They were informed of the 
name of the participant who had written the description (the actor), and the name of the 
participant whom the description was about (the target). The name of the actor was 
always Ronald or Laura, depending on the participant’s gender: All participants read 
about an actor of their own sex. In the target condition, the name of the target was the 
participant’s own name; in the observer condition it was Frances (Frank). 
 In all conditions, suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the ingratiating 
actor was induced by explaining that we were interested in how people describe others 
on whom they depend. Participants were led to believe that the actor a) expected to be 
dependent on the target for participation fee and b) expected the target to read his or her 
impression description.3 Participants were then informed of the instructions that had 
been given to the actor. For instance, in the target condition, it was explained that 
“Laura (Ronald) has been told that you will determine how much money she receives 
for this study. Second, we have explained to Laura the personality tests and have shown 
her your responses. Finally, she has been asked to type in her impression of you. We 
also told her that you were going to read this description.” Subsequently, the computer 
ostensibly started searching for the impression description, and stopped the search as 
soon as the actor’s data had been found. The ingratiating description contained several 
components of ingratiation, such as other-enhancement (e.g., “my impression is that 
she’s a really nice person, easy to get along with, and someone who has many 
qualities”) and expression of agreement and similarity (e.g., “we have the same ideas 
about many things,” “we are very much alike,” and “she’s given many responses that 
appeal to me.”)  
 After reading the flattering description, participants were asked to indicate their 
liking for the actor (1 = dislikeable, 7 = likeable) and to rate the actor on a series of 7-
point trait scales, including “sincere” and “slimy.” The instructions stressed that all 
questions were strictly anonymous and would not be shown to any other participant. 
 Subsequently, participants were offered the opportunity to receive personality 
test results about the actor. They were told that the personality tests used in this study 
were very reliable and that scores were adjusted for social desirability, so that the 
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personality scores presented a realistic picture of how a person really is. The 
explanation then read: “For each participant, we have a test score on 12 personality 
traits measured. You can choose one personality trait on which you would like to know 
Laura’s (Ronald’s) rating. Read all possibilities carefully, before you make your 
choice.” The 12 personality traits were presented in alphabetic order on the same screen. 
Each trait was described by one (sometimes fabricated) psychological term, 
accompanied by a brief description of the trait; for example: Hyperbolism (the degree to 
which a person is inclined to exaggerate). Participants selected the trait for which they 
wanted to know the actor’s test score.4 
 
Results 
 There was a main effect of experiment number, F(9, 471) = 1.89, p = .05; 
participants in Experiment 1 found the ingratiating actor more sincere and less slimy 
than in the other three experiments5. No other effects of experiment were found, so it 
was dropped from the analyses reported below. 
 A 2 (Condition) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on ratings for 
likeable, sincere, and slimy produced a main effect of Condition, F(3, 477) = 7.67, p < 
.01, η2 = .046. As hypothesized, participants in the target condition judged the actor as 
more likeable (M = 5.34 vs. M = 4.86), F(1, 479) = 19.36, p < .01; more sincere (M = 
4.31 vs. M = 3.94), F(1, 479) = 6.58, p = .01; and less slimy (M = 4.76 vs. M = 5.30), 
F(1, 479) = 11.56, p < .01 than observers.6 
 Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the observed frequencies and percentages 
of traits selected by targets and observers. Targets most often requested information on 
the trait reliable, whereas observers requested information on the trait “looks out for 
self-interest”. Based on the mean percentages from the pretest, we computed two 
variables: the informativeness of the requested trait for sliminess and the 
informativeness of the requested trait for sincerity. For instance, a participant requesting 
the trait “positive” would obtain a score of 64 and 38, for sincere and slimy respectively 
(see Table 3.1). A 2 (Condition) MANOVA on these scores, with Hypothesis (sincere, 
slimy) as a within-subjects factor, produced an interaction effect of Condition X 
Hypothesis (WS Factor): F(1, 481) = 18.45, p < .01. As hypothesized, targets asked 
more traits indicative of sincerity (M = 64.68) than of ingratiation (M = 47.85), whereas 
for observers this difference did not occur (M = 56.21 vs. M = 56.09 respectively). 
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Table 3.2 
Observed frequencies (and percentages) of selected traits for targets and observers 
  Condition 
Trait Category Trait† Target Observer 
Low-High reliable 56 (23.4 %) 37 (15.2 %) 
Low-High direct 42 (17.6 %) 29 (11.9 %) 
High-Low artificial 9 (3.8 %) 38 (15.6 %) 
High-Low exaggerative 10 (4.2 %) 14 (5.7 %) 
Low-Middle authoritarian 4 (1.7 %) 7 (2.9 %) 
Middle-Low distrustful 8 (3.3 %) 2 (.8 %) 
High-Middle complimentary 20 (8.4%) 18 (7.4 %) 
Middle-High positive 23 (9.6 %) 23 (9.4 %) 
Low-Low inhibited 6 (2.5 %) 6 (2.5 %) 
Low-Low hostile 3 (1.3 %) 6 (2.5 %) 
High-High ambitious 14 (5.9 %) 16 (6.6 %) 
High-High looks out for self-interest 44 (18.4 %) 48 (19.7 %) 
†
 Best possible translations from Dutch. 
  
Three participants did not fill out the self-esteem scale. A factor analysis on the 
ten self-esteem items for the remaining participants, revealed one factor with an Eigen 
Value of 5.35 and 53.48 % explained variance. After recoding three items, Cronbach’s 
α was .89. When self-esteem was included as a covariate in the analysis, the interaction 
effect of Condition X Hypothesis (WS Factor) remained, F(1, 477) = 17.81, p < .01, η2 
= .036, whereas there was no effect of self-esteem, F(1, 477) = 1.24, ns.  
 Because most students have a relatively high self-esteem, and we wanted to be 
sure to examine low self-esteem, we also divided our participants in a high and low self-
esteem group, with low self-esteem participants having a self-esteem score of 3.90 and 
lower. This variable was included as an additional independent variable. In this analysis, 
too, the interaction effect of Condition X Hypothesis (WS Factor) remained, F(1, 477) = 
18.78, p < .01, η2 = .038, whereas there was no effect of self-esteem group, F < 1. These 
results suggest that targets’ preference for traits reflecting sincerity emerged regardless 
of their level of self-esteem, i.e., regardless whether the description was consistent with 
their self-view. Instead, targets –including low self-esteem targets– seem to be 
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motivated to acquire sincerity-correspondent traits about the actor, whereas observers do 
not have a preference for sincere versus slimy traits. 
 
Discussion 
 As predicted, we obtained evidence that targets choose traits that confirm their 
preferred hypothesis. Although it is usually difficult to interpret null effects, in our 
opinion, the absence of any moderating role for self-esteem suggests that both high and 
low self-esteem targets are motivated to receive information indicating that the actor 
truly likes them. If the effect had a more cognitive basis, low self-esteem subjects would 
show hypothesis testing behavior similar to observers. Observers did not have a 
preference and equally requested traits indicative of sincerity and ingratiation. Although 
our conclusions may be preliminary we provide the first demonstration of the 
hypothesis-testing behavior of the “suspicious mind,” holding multiple, rival hypotheses 
about the actor’s motives (Fein, 1996). 
 Knowing what kind of information targets and observers wish to receive about 
the actor, we now move on to investigate what the effects are of actually receiving the 
requested information. Generally, we expect that a positive test score (information 
indicating that the ingratiator is sincere) will lead to a more positive impression, 
whereas a negative test score (information indicating that the ingratiator is slimy) will 
lead to a more negative impression. 
 However, efficient information gathering does not guarantee efficient or 
unbiased use of the information (Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & Skov, 1992). As 
noted before, targets are motivated to form a favorable impression of the actor, rather 
than dismiss the flattering episode as ingratiating. They request hypothesis-confirming 
information, implicitly hoping that their preferred hypothesis will be confirmed. If they 
receive information indicating that the actor is in fact low on the requested sincere trait, 
they might be unwilling to implement the information, because this would reflect 
negatively on the self. If, on the other hand, targets receive information indicating that 
the actor is high on sincerity, they are probably very willing to accept it without further 
consideration, because it confirms their preferred hypothesis. In contrast, an uninvolved 
observer is not motivated by vanity and might be more objective. Thus, an observer 
could be more willing to implement the information received, regardless of the 
implication. It is possible, then, that the effect of Test Score is qualified by Condition. 
On the other hand, it would be naïve of targets if they were totally blind to the received 
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information. Indeed, research suggests there are limits to the need for self-enhancement 
and targets do want to avoid being fooled (Marchand & Vonk, under review a). Targets 
may also be highly motivated to avoid looking silly and, hence, readily revise their 
relatively favorable impression when they learn that the actor is in fact low on sincerity. 
 In the second part of the experiment, we provided participants with information 
about the actor’s test results on the trait participants requested in the first part. The 
information reflected either a high or a low score on the requested trait (Test Score). We 
hypothesize that positive information leads to a more positive impression of the actor 
and negative information leads to a more negative impression. We also expect that 
targets are motivated by vanity, but not insanity: Even though they have a preference for 
information indicative of sincerity, we hypothesize, that when they receive the 
information they are also motivated to avoid being duped (Fein, 1996; Marchand & 
Vonk, under review a). Therefore, they are expected to implement both the positive and 
negative Test Scores, just as observers. 
 
Study 3.1 B 
 
Method 
 Procedure and stimulus materials. After participants in part A had selected a 
trait they wanted to know more about, they were told that this information was in fact 
available, as all participants had filled out a personality test, including the actor. It was 
explained that they would receive the requested test score of the actor and that, 
thereafter, they would again answer some questions about their impression of the actor. 
 Participants learned that the test score of the actor had been calculated by 
comparing it with a large group of other students who had filled out the personality test 
in a previous experiment; this way, we were able to determine for each participant 
whether they had a higher or lower score than average on a particular trait. 
Subsequently, the computer ostensibly started searching for the actor’s data on the trait 
requested and presented the test results. 
 An example of a test result read as follows: “The trait you want to know about 
Laura (Ronald) is: Authenticity, the degree to which somebody is straightforward. The 
test results show that Laura rates higher than average on this trait. Her score is in the 
80th percentile. This means that 80 % of our participants has a lower score on this trait 
than Laura.”  For half of the participants, the test score of the actor was high on the 
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requested trait, for the other half it was low. This was determined randomly. In the low 
test score condition, participants were told that the test score was lower than average, in 
the 20th percentile, meaning that 80 % of the participants has a higher score on this trait 
than the actor. Note that a high score on some traits (e.g., authenticity) reflects sincerity 
whereas a low score reflects sliminess; for other traits (e.g., artificial) this is reversed. In 
the analyses, Test Score for some traits was recoded such that all results reflecting 
sincerity were coded in the same direction. 
 After seeing the test result, participants read the ingratiating description for the 
second time, and again rated the actor on likeability and a series of traits including 
sincerity and sliminess. Finally, they were thanked, paid, and debriefed. 
 
Results7 
 Some traits were selected very infrequently (e.g., in the Low-Low Trait 
Category) and therefore removed from the analyses; this left 441 participants (294 
women and 147 men). To take into account the differential informativeness of the traits 
with regard to the two dimensions, five different trait categories were created: two high-
low traits combined, two low-high traits combined, two high-high traits combined, one 
middle-high trait, and one high-middle trait (see Table 3.1). 
 A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Test Score) X 5 (Trait Category) MANOVA on the second 
series of ratings for likeable, sincere, and slimy produced a main effect of Condition, 
F(3, 419) = 5.99, p < .01, η2 = .04. After receiving the requested information, targets 
again judged the actor as more likeable (M = 5.34 vs. M = 4.83), F(1, 421) = 14.56, p < 
.01; more sincere (M = 4.38 vs. M = 3.99), F(1, 421) = 5.73, p < .02; and less slimy (M 
= 4.24 vs. M = 4.82), F(1, 421) = 8.85, p < .01 than observers. In a subsequent analysis 
of covariance, we included the first ratings as covariates. In this analysis, the Condition 
effect disappeared, F(3, 416) = 1.26, ns., indicating that this effect can be explained 
entirely by differences at T1 that persisted at T2. 
 Just as the regular MANOVA, the analysis of covariance produced a main effect 
of Test Score, F(3, 416) = 38.08, p < .01. η2 = .22. Compared with participants who 
received a negative test score, participants who received a positive test score judged the 
actor as more likeable (M = 5.35 vs. M = 4.82), F(1, 418) = 32.04, p < .01; more sincere 
(M = 4.77 vs. M = 3.60), F(1, 418) = 89.04, p < .01; and less slimy (M = 3.94 vs. M = 
5.12), F(1, 418) = 69.10, p < .01. This effect was qualified by an interaction with Trait 
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Category; F(12, 407) = 2.99, p < .01, η2 = .03. As can be seen in Table 3.3, the effect of 
Test Score was smaller for the High-Middle category. Considering the overall pattern, 
we are inclined to see this result as a chance finding, or due to idiosyncratic 
characteristics of this category. In the Middle-High category, which is about the same in 
diagnosticity as the High-Middle category, ratings are affected very strongly by the test 
results. Thus, corroborating our recent findings (see Chapter 2; Marchand & Vonk, 
2005), moderately diagnostic information affects participants’ impressions. 
Interestingly, although the High-High category is not diagnostic at all, the effect of Test 
Score is quite substantial here, indicating that participants drew rather firm conclusions 
on the basis of the information received, even when this does not make logical sense. 
We will address this issue in the General Discussion.  
 
Table 3.3 
Mean scores of ratings for likeable, sincere, and slimy for the Test-score X Trait 
Category interaction 
   univariate F-tests 
 Likeable  
Trait Category positive test-score negative test-score F (4, 418) = 4.54** 
Low-High 5.57a 4.68b  
High-Low 5.17a 4.58b  
High-Middle 5.11a 5.30a  
Middle-High 5.63a 5.25a  
High-High 5.10a 4.21b  
 Sincere  
 positive negative F (4, 418) = 6.11** 
Low-High 5.25a 3.41b  
High-Low 4.77a 3.47b  
High-Middle 4.17a 3.70a  
Middle-High 5.30a 4.13b  
High-High 4.51a 3.19b  
 Slimy  
 positive negative F (4, 418) = 1.70 
Low-High 3.59a 4.99b  
High-Low 4.34a 5.00b  
High-Middle 4.72b 5.40b  
Middle-High 3.17a 4.69b  
High-High 4.12a 5.60b  
Note. Within each row, means with noncommon subscripts are significantly different at 
p < .01. 
** p < .01. 
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In general, then, Test Score affected the impression regardless of the 
diagnosticity of the trait requested8. Importantly, no interaction effects with Condition 
were found, Fs < 1, suggesting that targets implemented the received information just as 
much as observers, even when it did not converge with their preferred hypothesis. 
 
General Discussion 
There is ample evidence that most people can not distinguish honest from 
deceptive behavior of others (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999; 
DePaulo & Friedman, 1998; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Malone & DePaulo, 2001) and 
that people are not good at detecting insincerity (O’Sullivan, 2003). Although the 
detection of lies, or ulterior motives, seems to be difficult, recent research has shown 
that people can be quite sensitive to small cues indicating ulterior motives (see Chapter 
2; Marchand & Vonk, 2005), thus evoking suspicion.   
When people are suspicious, they postpone judgment and want to acquire further 
information that may help resolve the ambiguity about the actor’s true motives (Fein, 
1996). Because this is a quintessential feature of suspicion, it is remarkable that 
previous studies on suspicion have typically presented fixed information to participants. 
Our study is the first to inquire how suspicious perceivers select information when they 
have the opportunity to do so, thereby linking the suspicion phenomenon to the 
hypothesis-testing literature. As expected, because suspicious observers hold two 
multiple competing hypotheses, we found that they do not have a clear preference for 
information reflecting one or the other option. 
 A second new aspect of our study is that, by looking at differences between 
targets and observers in their information search, we were able to examine the 
motivational basis of hypothesis-testing behavior. Targets, who were motivated to hold 
a positive view of the actor, requested more traits indicative of sincerity than of 
ingratiation. Presumably, they implicitly hoped to receive information that would 
confirm their preferred hypothesis, that the actor was a sincere person. Subsequent 
analyses including participants’ self-esteem suggest that this preference is motivational 
and not cognitive, expectancy-based: Both high and low self-esteem targets requested 
traits indicative of sincerity, indicating that they both acquired information they would 
like to see confirmed, not information they expect to see confirmed. On a cognitive 
basis, low self-esteem targets should regard the flattering description as inconsistent 
with their self-views and, hence, due to self-verification (cf., Swann, Griffin, Predmore, 
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& Gaines, 1987), expect the actor to be inaccurate and insincere. If this is the hypothesis 
they are testing, they should select traits reflecting ingratiation. However, on the basis of 
a motivational, self-enhancement process, they like the flattery and prefer to see the 
actor as a sincere and likeable person. The present pattern of results suggests that 
targets’ evaluations of the actor as well as their hypothesis-testing behavior was guided 
primarily by this need for self-enhancement: Targets judged the actor as likeable and 
selected information indicating sincerity, regardless of their level of self-esteem. It 
needs to be said that conclusions are based on a null effect and remain preliminary. 
Observers, on the other hand, did not have a clear preference for information reflecting 
one or the other option, because they were testing two competing hypotheses. 
 A third way in which our study extends previous research is that we examined 
how the information that was gathered by participants themselves, subsequently 
affected their impressions. This allowed us to examine the persistence of targets’ 
preference for a favorable impression of the ingratiator. Previous research shows that 
there are limits to the need for self-enhancement and that even targets of ingratiation are 
not completely unaware of possible ulterior motives and want to avoid being fooled (see 
Chapter 4; Marchand & Vonk, under review a). As hypothesized, both targets and 
observers were affected by the requested information when they actually received it. A 
positive test score resulted in a more positive impression, a negative test score in a more 
negative impression. In general, then, targets seem to be motivated by vanity, not 
insanity. Although the target–observer difference in evaluations obtained at T1 was 
maintained at T2, we have reason to assume that this is primarily an anchoring effect 
(see Chapter 4; Marchand & Vonk, under review a). 
 For both targets and observers, it is remarkable that they were affected by the 
test scores regardless of how informative the information was. Some of the traits 
requested by participants were indicative of sincerity as well as ingratiation, so they 
were not very diagnostic. Rationally, such test scores should not have influenced the 
impression very much (Bassok & Trope, 1984; Trope & Bassok, 1982, 1983; Trope, 
Bassok, & Alon, 1984); and yet they did just as much as the more diagnostic test scores. 
A possible explanation is that, in our study, the distribution of the traits was only 
implicitly available. Skov and Sherman (1986) explicitly presented percentages on how 
characteristics were distributed for each creature, and participants could easily see the 
difference in the distribution of the characteristics. The apparent prevalence for 
diagnostic information may be partially due to this presentation format, that is rarely 
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present outside the laboratory (Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Palma-Oliveira, 2001). We 
used real traits and, as in real life, did not provide percentages, assuming that the 
distribution of the traits was implicitly available in participants’ minds. In this situation, 
people may not notice as easily that some traits are not very informative. Hence, on the 
planet Earth, where frequency percentages of traits are not explicit, people’s search 
strategies may often be based on erroneous conceptions of what an informative trait is. 
 Another explanation why participants were affected by even nondiagnostic 
information is that the context affects the meaning of the trait (cf., Asch, 1946; 
Hamilton & Zanna, 1974; Wyer & Watson, 1969; Wyer, 1974). For example, the 
ambiguous trait “looks out for self interest” can occur among both sincere and slimy 
people. Participants testing the sincere hypothesis may have given a more positive 
meaning to the trait “looks out for self interest” (e.g., not being a pushover), whereas 
participants testing the slimy hypothesis may have assigned a more negative 
connotation to it (e.g., being self-centered). This way, the test score does provide 
diagnostic information, because the hypothesis being tested changed the meaning of the 
trait (a sincere person is not as self-centered as a slimy person). 
 Apparently, participants were unaware that the information they requested was 
not always diagnostic. For example, when participants request the actor’s test score on 
the trait “looks out for self interest”, they presumably saw the test result as meaningful 
and assumed that a negative test score indicates high “sliminess,” because people 
ingratiate themselves to get ahead in the world. In actuality, the trait is not diagnostic 
because both sincere and slimy people are perceived to possess this trait to some extent. 
However, if participants implicitly assume that looking out for self interest is indicative 
of sliminess, and thus conclude after a negative test score that the actor really is slimy as 
expected, they ignore the fact that sincere people often look out for their self interest as 
well (cf., the base-rate fallacy and the representativeness heuristic; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Tversky & Kahneman, in: Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). 
 Our differential judgments and trait selections among targets and observers 
provide yet another illustration of the pervasive need for self-enhancement. For 
instance, people judge positive traits to be more characteristic of the self than negative 
ones (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986), they process and recall positive personality 
information more efficiently than negative personality information (Kuiper & Derry, 
1982; Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; Kuiper, Olinger, MacDonald, & Shaw, 1985), and 
are more likely to attribute positive than negative outcomes to the self (Bradley, 1978; 
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Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross & Fletcher, 1985; Zuckerman, 1979). Nevertheless, our 
findings also suggest that people are quite willing to revise their initial impression 
when they receive additional information revealing the flatterer’s insincerity. For 
observers, this is not a surprising result, however, for targets the description was self-
relevant so we might have expected them to accept the flattery without much thought 
(Gordon, 1996; Vonk, 2002) and maintain their favorable impression of the actor in 
the face of one slight piece of disconfirming evidence. The results suggest, however, 
that the possibility of ulterior motives makes targets less prone to persevere in their 
favorable impression of the actor, even though the actor boosted their self-esteem. 
The neutral judgments after additional information indicate that targets became 
suspicious after receiving additional negative information. Thus, suspicion of ulterior 
motives is a way to encourage healthy skepticism that can facilitate even the 
acceptance of evidence that is not preferred or not convenient. 
 
Endnotes 
1
 “In the Netherlands, where these studies were conducted, there is no general 
word for ingratiation… The verb ‘to slime’ [slijmen] refers to the behavior of 
ingratiating oneself for ulterior motives… As in English, a person who engages in this 
type of behavior is described by the adjective ‘slimy’ [slijmerig]. The word ‘slime’ and 
its conjugations have a negative connotation and are used frequently to describe flattery, 
overly friendly behavior, and brown-nosing. So, for all practical purposes, these words 
refer to the same class of behaviors as the term ingratiation, but they are much more 
informal” (quoted from Vonk, 1998b, pp. 849-850). 
 
2
 The data analyzed in this study are a combination of data from four 
experiments conducted at Leiden University and Radboud University Nijmegen. For 
a more detailed description of the separate experiments, see Vonk, 2002. The four 
experiments are almost identical, but they each contained different independent 
variables which were dropped from the present analyses. The previously reported 
studies (Vonk, 2002) focus on the effects of Condition and other independent 
variables on the first impressions of the actor. The results described in the present 
paper, on subsequent information search and the effects of this additional 
information, have not been reported previously. 
 
3
 In experiment one, expected interaction was manipulated, such that half of 
the participants were misled to believe they would work on a task with the actor; in 
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the other experiments there was no expected interaction, and participants were told 
that participants in the other group were receiving a smaller financial reward for the 
study, and that they could later decide to increase the reward of the actor.   
 
4
 In one experiment, participants were subsequently allowed to obtain test 
results on a second and third trait; analyses on the combined 1st through 3rd choice 
produced the same pattern of results as on the 1st choice only, so this question was 
dropped in subsequent experiments. 
 
5
 This effect can be accounted for by the expected interaction among half of 
the participants in this experiment (see footnote 3). 
 
6 Also, a main effect of gender was found: Women judged the actor as more 
likeable, more sincere, and less slimy. This effect was qualified by an interaction with 
Condition, such that female targets rated the actor more favorably than male targets, 
whereas for male and female observers there was no difference. Because gender 
effects are difficult to interpret in this study (since gender of the participant and 
gender of the actor are confounded), it was dropped from subsequent analyses. 
 
7
 Experiment number and gender did not show any systematic main or 
interaction effects; therefore, they were dropped from the analyses. Self-esteem did 
not mediate any of the effects found and is not described further. 
 
8
 Regression analysis produced the same results. 
  
Chapter 4 
I Bet You Say That To All The Girls (Boys): 
When Flattery Does Not Work* 
 
Suppose someone approaches you after a presentation that you held and tells you 
it was the most interesting talk he or she ever heard. You feel flattered and start talking 
with the person. While you are pondering a little if your presentation was really that 
great, you think “That is a really nice person.” A colleague, who is standing next to you, 
later says “Who was that sweet-talker, what did he want from you?” 
 Research demonstrates that people who are flattered judge the flatterer as more 
credible, and like the person more, than people who observe the ingratiating behavior as 
outsiders (Gordon, 1996). This target-observer difference is caused by the target’s 
motivation to be flattered (Vonk, 2002). When people are the target of ingratiation, their 
self-esteem is served by accepting the flattery uncritically; they feel good about 
themselves when they are flattered and do not question the ingratiator’s motives. On the 
other hand, when people are observing ingratiating behavior, their ego is not at stake 
and they may examine the behavior more thoroughly. In the example above, this would 
mean that you, as the receiver of a compliment, form a more favorable impression of the 
ingratiator -this way serving your self-esteem- than your colleague, who is an 
uninvolved observer of the interaction. 
 Researchers have unsuccessfully tried to identify variables that moderate or 
qualify the target-observer effect. Vonk (2002) found that the target-observer difference 
in judgments of an ingratiator is not affected by variables such as cognitive resources, 
the motive to like one’s interaction partner, the motive to form an accurate impression, 
or mood. Nor is it qualified by personality variables such as self-esteem, dominance 
orientation, or narcissism. Thus, we can conclude that the target-observer effect is quite 
robust. This is underscored by the results from a study we conducted (see Chapter 3; 
Marchand & Vonk, under review b) in which the target-observer difference persisted 
even after participants received additional trait information discrediting the ingratiator. 
For example, after they received information that the ingratiator was not very reliable 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Marchand, M. A. G., & Vonk, R. (under review a). 
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compared to other people, targets still judged the ingratiator as more likeable and more 
sincere than observers did. Thus, it appears that targets maintain their relatively positive 
impression of the ingratiator, even when they obtain trait information that sheds a 
different light on the ingratiating behavior. 
 In this sense, the target-observer difference resembles a perseverance effect, in 
that the impression that targets form of the ingratiator is remarkably perseverant and 
unresponsive to new input, even in the face of discrediting evidence (cf., Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). However, it is possible that the 
discrediting evidence used so far was not powerful enough. In our earlier study we used 
trait information to influence the target-observer effect, whereas in general trait 
descriptions are seen as relatively uninformative compared with behavior descriptions 
(Rodin, 1972). Behavior descriptions, even though they are more specific than traits, are 
seen as “hard evidence” of how a person really is. In addition, they are more concrete 
and vivid. It is conceivable that the target-observer difference persists unless targets are 
confronted with such hard evidence; i.e., when we rub their face in the ingratiator’s 
insincerity by means of concrete, vivid, and salient behavioral information. Generally, 
information that is salient, available, or vivid tends to have more impact (e.g., Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Therefore, in the present study, instead of 
providing participants with trait information that the ingratiator is insincere, we made 
sure that participants found this out themselves, by observing that the ingratiator 
flattered another person in exactly the same way. 
 We examined the effects of this additional behavior information in an internet 
dating setting. Targets and observers received an extremely positive description (T1), 
after which it became clear that the ingratiator said the same ingratiating things to 
another person (T2). At T1, we predict a target-observer difference for judgments of the 
ingratiator, replicating earlier research. At T2, we hypothesize that this difference will 
disappear. We also measured cognitive variables (based on Swann, Griffin, Predmore, 
and Gaines, 1987) and affective variables (mood) at T1 and T2.  
 
Study 4.1 
 
Overview 
In an experiment simulating a dating situation, participants received an 
ingratiating response to their own profile (targets) or to the profile of another participant 
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(observers), and formed an impression about the person who wrote the response (actor). 
Subsequently, participants read an almost identical ingratiating response from the same 
actor, this time about the profile of another (third) participant, thus revealing the 
insincerity of the actor, after which they rated the actor again. 
 
Method 
 Participants and design. Participants were 81 undergraduates with different 
majors (45 women, 36 men) at the Radboud University Nijmegen. They were recruited 
from a subject pool that was set up at the beginning of the academic year. They were 
approached by telephone to participate in an experiment about internet dating. An 
appointment was made when participants agreed to take part in the experiment. The 
design was a Condition (target, observer) X Time (measure at T1 or T2) mixed subjects 
design, with Condition as a between- and Time as a within-subjects variable. 
 Materials. The materials used in this study are a profile, two flattering 
descriptions from an alleged other participant, and several dependent variables. The 
profile was a form on which participants filled out their personal characteristics. The 
profile screen looked different from other screens in the experiment: It had a different 
lay-out, font, font size, and color. Due to the use of radio buttons, it resembled an 
internet page, also because participants used mouse clicks to fill out the profile, whereas 
during the rest of the experiment they used the keyboard. Participants had to indicate 
their gender, age, and whether they were looking for a friendship, a relationship, sex, or 
e-mail contact. Furthermore, they were asked to select from 12 options what they felt 
was important in a friendship or relationship: for example, respect, intelligence, 
intimacy, honesty, good sex, equality (multiple responses were possible); from 15 
options what their most important personality traits were: for example, humorous, 
extraverted, modest, impulsive, sportive, romantic; and from 12 options what their 
hobbies were: for example, reading, going to the cinema, listening to music, traveling, 
shopping, going out, playing sports. Finally, participants had to type an open-ended 
description of themselves in a box at the bottom of the screen. 
 The profiles filled out by alleged other participants looked exactly the same, but 
were already filled out and could not be edited. These profiles were of Simon/Simone 
and Michiel/Michelle (depending on the participant’s sex) and were filled out in a way a 
typical student would.   
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 Two flattering responses to a profile were used, allegedly given by another 
participant. The first flattering response was from Martin/Martine, whose name was 
indicated at the bottom of the page by showing the sender’s name. In the experimental 
condition, in which participants read a response to their own profile, it was made clear 
at the top of the page that it was a response to the profile of “…” (participant’s own 
name), in the control condition it was a response to the profile of “Daan” or “Daantje” 
(depending on the participant’s sex). The description itself was quite flattering and went 
as follows: 
“Great that I received your profile. I was afraid I had to respond to somebody I 
wouldn’t find interesting at all, but the opposite is true. You seem like an 
extremely nice person. You find exactly the same things important that I do. I 
also feel you have many different interests and that you are fun to be around, but 
you can also be serious when necessary and you think about what’s important in 
life. I think it’s super that I received your profile!!! and I wonder if it was a 
coincidence or that it was meant to be ;-) ” 
The second flattering description was also from Martin/Martine (depending on the 
participant’s sex) and was similar to the first one. This time it was a response to “Leon” 
or “Leonie”. There were some changes in the order of the text and some words were 
replaced by their synonyms, but in other respects the two responses were the same. Both 
responses contained a few typing errors in order to appear realistic.  
 We used three different kinds of dependent variables, all measured on 7-point 
scales: 1) Judgments about the actor on a series of 9 traits, including likeable, sincere, 
and slimy1. 2) Cognitive variables (12 in total), e.g., how accurate do you think the 
actor’s impression is; how informative do you think the description is. 3) Affective 
variables (10 in total), in which we asked participants to indicate how they felt at that 
moment (e.g., happy, sad, angry). 
 Procedure. Participants participated in groups of 6 to 8 in which half were 
men and half were women. Sometimes they saw each other before the experiment 
started, but they never knew any of the participants of the other sex. Upon arrival for 
their appointment, they were seated behind a computer in individual cubicles. They 
were told they would take part in a study about internet dating, in which we would be 
looking at first impressions in internet contacts. They were led to believe that the 
computers were connected to each other, so that information could be transmitted from 
one participant to the other. They were told that the internet site was a simulation 
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because we did not want participants to surf the web during the experiment, so they 
were not really on the internet but were connected only with the other participants 
taking part at that moment. They waited until everyone was present and then the 
experimenter started the program. 
 The instructions repeated that we would be simulating an internet situation in 
which participants would have to pretend visiting a dating website. In this type of 
relationship seeking, it was explained, the first impression is often the most important. 
People decide to contact a person or not on the basis of a very short description (profile) 
of that person. When they receive a response to their profile, they decide on the basis of 
that response whether they want to pursue contact with the responder. We were 
interested in what people say in their profiles and particularly in how people respond to 
others’ profile, in order to achieve a positive result, and how these responses affect the 
first impression. Participants were told that we wanted to motivate them to write 
realistic, positive responses to the profiles of others, and therefore the person who 
received the most positive evaluation as a result of their response, would win € 10.00. 
This way, we gave the ingratiator an ulterior motive for writing a flattering response. 
 Participants were asked to type in their first name and their gender. It was 
explained that this was necessary for the computer program to be able to send profiles to 
persons of the opposite sex. Participants then filled out the profile, in which they could 
mark their interests, hobbies, and personality traits. After clicking “send”, the computer 
ostensibly started to send the profile to two other participants of the opposite sex who 
would respond to it; in reality, nobody read the profile of the participant. 
 Next, participants were invited to give a response to two profiles of other 
participants of the opposite sex. This was done to make it credible that at the same time, 
the profile of the participant was also being viewed by two persons. The computer 
ostensibly started searching for a profile, and after a while came up with the profile of 
Simon or Simone (depending on the participant’s sex). The participant read the profile 
and could respond to it by clicking “respond”. The response indicated the name of the 
participant and the name of the person whose profile was being viewed 
(Simon/Simone). After the participant had written and sent the response, the computer 
immediately searched for the second profile of Michiel or Michelle. Again, the 
participant read the profile, typed a response, and sent it by clicking “send”. 
 Subsequently, participants read that they would now read someone else’s 
response to a profile and that they were asked to form an impression of the person who 
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wrote the response. They were asked to imagine, just as in an internet dating situation, 
that they had received a response to a profile on the internet and had to decide whether 
or not the other person was interesting enough to give a reply. Thus, they were asked to 
give an evaluation of the person who wrote the response. Half of the participants were 
told that the response was to their own profile, the other half read that they would 
receive a response to a profile of somebody else.2  
Participants then read the flattering response to either their own profile or 
another profile and rated the ingratiator on a series of trait scales (including likeable, 
sincere, and slimy), on cognitive variables, followed by the affective variables (mood). 
The second flattering response came from the same ingratiator, but this time it was 
always a response to the profile of another (third) participant. At this point, then, the 
participants found out that the ingratiator made almost the same flattering comments 
towards another participant. Participants rated the same ingratiator on the same 
dependent variables. The instructions stressed that all responses were strictly 
anonymous and would not be shown to any other participant. Several additional 
questions were asked, such as whether the participant was heterosexual, had ever met 
someone on the internet, and if the participant was single or not. 
 Finally, to probe for suspicion, participants were asked to type in their ideas 
about the goal of the study. Then they returned to the experimenter, who paid, thanked 
and debriefed them. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Three participants were excluded from the analyses (1 target, 2 observers), one 
because she was in the wrong condition (see footnote 2), and two because their 
responses to the open-ended question reflected suspicion about the goal of the study. 
Participants’ gender did not influence the results (all Fs < 1) and was removed from 
analyses. Sexual preference (heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual), relationship status 
(single or not), and whether or not participants had ever met someone on the internet did 
not moderate any of the results found (Fs ≤ 1.67, ns.) and are therefore not discussed.3 
 A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Time) multivariate analysis of variance, with T1 vs. T2 as 
within-subjects variable, on ratings for likeable, sincere, and slimy produced a main 
effect of Condition, F(3, 74) = 3.61, p < .05, η2 = .13. Participants in the target 
condition judged the actor as more likeable (M = 4.93, SD = 1.16) than observers (M = 
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3.97, SD = 1.56), F(1, 76) = 9.57, p < .01 and as more sincere (M = 3.56, SD = 1.29) 
than observers (M = 2.89, SD = 1.15), F(1, 76) = 5.78, p < .05; on ratings for slimy the 
means were as expected, but the difference failed to reach significance (targets: M = 
5.76, SD = 1.27; observers: M = 6.14, SD = 1.01), F(1, 76) = 2.05, ns. These results 
replicate the target-observer effect. A main effect of Time, F(3, 74) = 19.33, p < .01, η2 
= .44, indicated that, compared with T1, participants judged the actor at T2 as less 
likeable (M1 = 5.24, SD1 = 1.87 vs. M2 = 3.73, SD2 = 1.74), F(1, 76) = 35.91, p < .01 
and less sincere (M1 = 3.88, SD1 = 1.64 vs. M2 = 2.62, SD2 = 1.50), F(1, 76) = 35.64, p 
< .01; on ratings for slimy there was no significant difference (M1 = 5.92, SD1 = 1.34 
vs. M2 = 5.95, SD2 = 1.35), F < 1. The interaction effect was not significant, F(3, 74) = 
1.37, ns. 
 Effects found on the cognitive variable (Cronbach’s α = .86) paralleled those 
on the trait ratings and were completely mediated by these ratings. Therefore, these 
effects are not described further below.4 
 Regarding the affective variables, Cronbach’s α for the items happy, positive, 
proud, angry, and disappointed (after recoding the latter two) was .75.5 An ANOVA on 
this scale produced a main effect of Condition, F(1, 76) = 6.26, p < .05, η2 = .08, of 
Time, F(1, 76) = 14.95, p < .01, η2 = .16, and a significant two-way interaction, F(1, 76) 
= 7.67, p < .01, η2 = .09. At T1 targets (M = 5.76, SD = .78) felt significantly better than 
observers (M = 5.14, SD = .80), F(1, 76) = 12.05, p < .01, whereas at T2 the difference 
between targets and observers disappeared (respectively, M = 5.19, SD = .80 and M = 
5.04, SD = .71), F < 1. 
 In short, the hypothesis that the target-observer effect would disappear at T2 was 
only confirmed for the affective variables and not for the judgments. This may be due to 
the fact that targets are still motivated at T2 to judge the ingratiator as more likeable, 
sincere, and less slimy, even though their affective response has been affected. 
Alternatively, it is possible that an anchoring effect affected the ratings at T2 (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). Since the dependent variables were assessed both at T1 and T2, 
the measure at T1 could have served as an anchor for the second measure, this way 
sustaining the target-observer difference. Both groups adjusted their impressions at T2, 
but if they retrieved their initial ratings at T1 as an anchor (which were more positive 
for targets) the difference persists. To examine this possibility, we conducted a second 
study with measurements at T2 only. 
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Study 4.2 
 
Method 
Forty-three students (13 men, 30 women) at the Radboud University Nijmegen 
participated in Study 4.2. The method was the same6 as in Study 4.1, with the exception 
that all dependent variables were assessed only at T2; at T1 participants only wrote 
down their thoughts about the actor for three minutes. 
 
Results 
The results from Study 4.2 show that for all dependent variables, there was no 
effect for Condition at T2; all Fs < 1.29, η2s ≤ .03. Targets and observers rated the same 
on judgments and affect (for mean scores at T2, see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 
Means, SDs (enclosed in parentheses) and F-values for the univariate analyses of the 
results from Study 4.1 and 4.2 combined 
  Time  
Dependent Variables Condition T1 T2 Condition X Time 
Likeable Target 
Observer 
5.88 (1.37)  
4.50 (2.12) 
3.82 (1.65) 
3.81 (1.50) 
F(1, 117) = 4.53* 
 
Sincere Target 
Observer 
4.26 (1.65) 
3.44 (1.52) 
2.45 (1.37) 
2.52 (1.40) 
F(1, 117) = 2.34 
 
Slimy Target 
Observer 
5.67 (1.48) 
6.22 (1.10) 
6.14 (1.08) 
5.62 (1.83) 
F(1, 117) = 4.17* 
 
Affect Target 
Observer 
5.76 (.78) 
5.14 (.80) 
5.09 (.75) 
5.00 (.81) 
F(1, 117) = 3.17† 
 
*p < .05. †p = .08.  
 
Thus, as hypothesized, the target-observer difference disappeared for ratings at 
T2, suggesting that the difference in Study 4.1 was caused by anchoring effects. 
Unfortunately, these are null effects. To examine the predicted Condition X Time 
interaction, we added the data from Study 4.2 to the data from Study 4.1 (i.e., we 
combined Study 4.1 and 4.2), such that ratings at T1 are from Study 4.1 and ratings at 
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T2 are from Study 4.2, allowing a between-subjects comparison. In this analysis, the 
hypothesized Condition X Time interaction for ratings on likeable, sincere, and slimy 
was marginally significant, F(3, 115) = 2.52, p = .06, η2 = .06; at T1 a target-observer 
effect occurred, whereas at T2 this effect disappeared (for the univariate analyses, see 
Table 4.1). 
 
Discussion 
Study 4.1 replicates the target-observer difference at T1: Targets judged the 
ingratiator as more likeable, more sincere, and less slimy than observers. Study 4.2 
shows that these differences disappear at T2, provided that no ratings have been given at 
T1. Thus, it appears that the target-observer difference that remained present at T2 in 
the first study can be ascribed to an anchoring effect, since the difference disappeared in 
the second study. For the affective variables, no anchoring effect was found in the first 
study, which may be explained by assuming that participants give their ratings for affect 
more intuitively and on a more implicit level. Therefore, they may not base their 
affective response on their earlier ratings for affect, but base it on how they experience 
their emotions. For the judgments, we assume that the first ratings were used as an 
anchor for the second ratings. Another possible explanation is that the anchoring effect 
was not found in affective ratings due to the instruction. We explicitly asked 
participants to indicate how they felt “at that moment” and participants therefore may 
not have used the earlier ratings. 
 In Study 4.3, we want to replicate these results in a single study. Based on the 
results from Study 4.1, we hypothesize a replication of the target-observer difference at 
T1. And based on Study 4.2, we hypothesize that this difference disappears at T2. In 
addition, we assessed reading times to see how long participants took to read the two 
flattering responses and think about them. Fein (1996) suggests that suspicion of ulterior 
motives triggers active, sophisticated attributional thinking. Presumably, observers are 
more suspicious about the motives of the ingratiator than targets, so we hypothesize that 
observers process the response at T1 in a more systematic way than targets, who simply 
accept the response as accurate. At T1, then, we predict longer reading times for 
observers than for targets, indicating that they are more uncertain about their judgment 
(Ybarra, Schaberg, & Keiper, 1999). At T2, in general, we expect reading times to be 
shorter than at T1, because participants read almost the same text for the second time. 
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We also predict that when observers receive specific and diagnostic evidence of the 
actor’s insincerity, they are not suspicious anymore, but are certain and, as a result, they 
read the second response very fast. Targets, on the other hand, should become 
suspicious for the first time when they receive the additional information. Thus, they 
will be more uncertain about their judgment, and reading times will be relatively long. 
 In addition to the assessment of the reading times, participants in this study are 
asked to what extent they feel “fooled” and “hurt”; these are more specific feelings that 
we assume could be particularly relevant to the process among targets. For these two 
emotions, we hypothesize that the target-observer difference is only present at T2, 
because at that moment targets find out that the ingratiator is insincere, and they may 
feel fooled and possibly hurt because they “bought it” at T1. Observers, on the other 
hand, were already suspicious and therefore do not feel fooled. Thus, we predict an 
interaction effect of Condition X Time for these specific emotions. 
 
Study 4.3 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were 88 undergraduates with different 
majors (67 women, 21 men) at the Radboud University Nijmegen. They were invited to 
participate in an experiment about internet dating during a psychology seminar for 
freshmen. An appointment was made when participants agreed to take part in the 
experiment. Other participants volunteered at the laboratory and made an appointment 
on the spot. The design was a Condition (target versus observer) X Time (measure at T1 
or T2) between-subjects design. The materials used were identical to those in Study 4.1. 
Procedure. Comparable to Study 4.1 and 4.2, the study simulated a dating 
situation: Targets and observers received an ingratiating response to their own profile or 
to the profile of another participant (Condition), and formed an impression about the 
person who wrote the response (actor). Subsequently, participants received an almost 
identical ingratiating response from the same actor, this time about the profile of another 
(third) participant, thus revealing the insincerity of the actor. Reading times for both 
responses were assessed unobtrusively: The computer registered the time from the 
moment participants started reading the response until the moment they pressed the 
return key to continue. Participants wrote down their thoughts for three minutes 
immediately after they read the ingratiating response, both at T1 and T2. After these 
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three minutes, judgments about the actor (likeable, sincere, and slimy) and affective 
variables (mood), including “fooled” and “hurt” were measured, either at T1 or T2 
(varied between subjects), so they were assessed only once.  
 
Results 
One participant erroneously assumed that the second response came from 
someone of the same sex, and was excluded from the analyses. There were no 
systematic gender effects, so gender was removed from the analyses. 
 A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Time) multivariate7 analysis of variance on ratings for 
likeable, sincere, and slimy produced a main effect of Time, F(3, 81) = 7.80, p < .01, η2 
= .22, as well as the predicted Condition X Time interaction, F(3, 81) = 2.84, p < .05, η2 
= .10 (see Table 4.2). At T1, targets judged the actor as more likeable (M = 5.77, SD = 
.75) than observers (M = 5.14, SD = .96), whereas at T2 this difference was absent (M = 
4.41, SD = 1.05 versus M = 4.64, SD = 1.22, respectively), F(1, 83) = 3.91, p = .05, η2 = 
.05. Furthermore, targets judged the actor at T1 as more sincere (M = 4.64, SD = 1.36) 
than observers (M = 3.48, SD = 1.69), whereas at T2 this difference disappeared (M = 
2.64, SD = 1.18 versus M = 3.09, SD = 1.66, respectively), F(1, 83) = 6.42, p = .01, η2 = 
.07. Finally, targets judged the actor at T1 as less slimy (M = 5.36, SD = 1.47) than 
observers (M = 6.00, SD = 1.34), whereas at T2 this difference was absent (M = 6.50, 
SD = .80 versus M = 6.09, SD = 1.06, respectively), F(1, 83) = 4.16, p < .05, η2 = .05. 
There was no main effect for Condition, F < 1. 
 
Table 4.2 
Means, SDs (enclosed in parentheses) and F-values for the univariate analyses of the 
results from Study 4.3 
  Time  
Dependent Variables Condition T1 T2 Condition X Time 
Likeable Target 
Observer 
5.77 (.75) 
5.14 (.96) 
4.41 (1.05) 
4.64 (1.22) 
F(1, 83) = 3.91* 
 
Sincere Target 
Observer 
4.64 (1.36) 
3.48 (1.69) 
2.64 (1.18) 
3.09 (1.66) 
F(1, 83) = 6.42** 
 
Slimy Target 
Observer 
5.36 (1.47) 
6.00 (1.34) 
6.50 (.80) 
6.09 (1.06) 
F(1, 83) = 4.16* 
 
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01.  
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 Regarding the affective variables, Cronbach’s α for the items happy, positive, 
proud, angry, and disappointed (after recoding the latter two) was .72. An ANOVA on 
the mean of this scale produced a main effect of Condition, F(1, 83) = 13.02, p < .01, η2 
= .14; a main effect of Time, F(1, 83) = 4.58, p < .05, η2 = .05; and a significant two-
way interaction, F(1, 83) = 5.67, p < .05, η2 = .06 (see Table 4.3). At T1, targets (M = 
5.91, SD = .45) felt significantly better than observers (M = 4.93, SD = .86), whereas at 
T2 the difference between targets and observers disappeared (respectively, M = 5.17, 
SD = .86 versus M = 4.97, SD = .80). 
 
Table 4.3 
Means, SDs (enclosed in parentheses) and F-values for the univariate analyses of the 
affective results from Study 4.3 
Affect Target 
Observer 
5.91 (.45) 
4.93 (.86) 
5.17 (.86) 
4.97 (.80) 
F(1, 83) = 5.67* 
 
Fooled Target 
Observer 
1.14 (.35) 
1.62 (1.12) 
3.09 (1.77) 
1.73 (1.20) 
F(1, 83) = 12.43** 
Hurt Target 
Observer 
1.18 (.66) 
1.57 (1.25) 
2.14 (1.49) 
1.27 (.88) 
F(1, 83) = 6.86** 
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01.  
 
 A separate 2 (Condition) X 2 (Time) multivariate analysis of variance on ratings 
for the variables “feeling fooled” and “feeling hurt” produced a main effect of Time, 
F(2, 82) = 8.77, p < .01, η2 = .18; as well as the predicted two-way interaction, F(2, 82) 
= 6.25, p < .01, η2 = .13. Targets at T1 did not feel fooled (M = 1.14, SD = .35) or hurt 
(M = 1.18, SD = .66), just as observers did not feel fooled (M = 1.62, SD = 1.12) or hurt 
(M = 1.57, SD = 1.25), whereas at T2 targets felt more fooled (M = 3.09, SD = 1.77) and 
hurt (M = 2.14, SD = 1.49) than observers (M = 1.73, SD = 1.20 and M = 1.27, SD = 
.88) respectively (see Table 4.3). There was no main effect for Condition, F(2, 82) = 
1.40, ns. 
 In the analyses of the reading times, two participants (1 target, 1 observer) were 
removed because they were outliers (i.e., more than three standard deviations from the 
mean). A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Time) ANOVA on the reading times, with Time as within-
subjects variable, produced a main effect of Condition, F(1, 83) = 3.85, p = .05, η2 = 
I Bet You Say That To All The Girls (Boys) 57
.04; a main effect of Time, F(1, 83) = 35.05, p < .01, η2 = .30; and a significant two-
way interaction, F(1, 83) = 9.83, p < .01, η2 = .11 (see Table 4.4). As hypothesized, 
observers read the ingratiating response longer at T1 (M = 63.47s, SD = 26.99) than 
targets (M = 48.47s, SD = 17.24), indicating that observers were more uncertain about 
their judgment. At T2, targets (M = 41.60s, SD = 18.21) and observers (M = 41.14s, SD 
= 18.18) did not differ in their reading times. As hypothesized, participants in general 
read the second response faster than the first. Surprisingly, targets did not read the 
second response longer than observers. This issue will be addressed in the general 
discussion. 
 
Table 4.4 
Means, SDs (enclosed in parentheses) and F-values for the analyses of the reading 
times from Study 4.3 
  Response  
Dependent Variables Condition T1 T2 Condition X Time 
Reading times Target 
Observer 
48.47s (17.24) 
63.47s (26.99) 
41.60s (18.21) 
41.14s (18.18) 
F(1, 83) = 9.83** 
 
** p < .01. 
 
 Although we did not formulate any hypotheses about participants’ open-ended 
thought listings, these were also analyzed. We counted the number of times a word 
occurred in the following categories: 1) positive evaluative judgments of the ingratiator 
(i.e., trait terms such as likeable and spontaneous), 2) negative evaluative judgments 
(i.e., trait terms, such as slimy and insincere), 3) positive cognitive remarks (e.g., the 
description is accurate or is indeed about me), 4) negative cognitive remarks (e.g., the 
description is not accurate or not about me), 5) positive affective comments (e.g., I feel 
good, cheerful), 6) negative affective comments (e.g., I feel bad, disappointed), 7) 
positive behavioral intention (e.g., I would like to meet the ingratiator, go on a date with 
the ingratiator), 8) negative behavioral intention (e.g., do not want to go on a date), and 
9) ulterior motives of the ingratiator (e.g., the ingratiator wants to win extra money, is 
desperately looking for a date). A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Time) MANOVA on the 
frequencies of these nine categories, with Time as within-subjects variable, produced a 
main effect of Condition, F(13, 71) = 3.45, p < .01, η2 = .39; a main effect of Time, 
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F(13, 71) = 8.19, p < .01, η2 = .60; and a significant two-way interaction, F(13, 71) = 
2.13, p < .05, η2 = .28 (see Table 4.5).  
 
Table 4.5 
 Means, SDs (enclosed in parentheses) and F-values for the thought listings analyses 
from Study 4.3 
  Time  
Dependent Variables Condition T1 T2 Condition X Time 
positive evaluation Target 
Observer 
2.90 (1.30) 
1.93 (1.56) 
1.14 (1.16) 
1.09 (1.31) 
F(1, 83) = 6.19** 
 
negative evaluation Target 
Observer 
.38 (.70) 
.63 (.98) 
.93 (1.05) 
.93 (1.06) 
F(1, 83) = 1.03 
 
positive cognition Target 
Observer 
.60 (.86) 
.26 (.44) 
.02 (.15) 
.12 (.32) 
F(1, 83) = 7.24** 
 
negative cognition Target 
Observer 
.52 (.67) 
.67 (.89) 
.43 (.63) 
.53 (.63) 
F(1, 83) < 1 
 
positive behavior Target 
Observer 
.62 (.54) 
.16 (.37) 
.29 (.55) 
.07 (.26) 
F(1, 83) = 3.78* 
 
negative behavior Target 
Observer 
.05 (.22) 
.12 (.32) 
.17 (.44) 
.05 (.21) 
F(1, 83) = 4.14* 
positive affect Target 
Observer 
.74 (.91) 
.07 (.34) 
.33 (.61) 
.07 (.34) 
F(1, 83) = 8.00** 
negative affect Target 
Observer 
.02 (.15) 
.19 (.50) 
.38 (.58) 
.23 (.53) 
F(1, 83) = 4.53* 
ulterior motive Target 
Observer 
.31 (.56) 
.79 (.89) 
.90 (1.01) 
.74 (.98) 
F(1, 83) = 6.85** 
 
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. 
 
In general, participants’ written thoughts paralleled the other results. At T1, 
targets wrote more thoughts about positive evaluation (“I think he is very sympathetic”), 
positive cognition (“It is as if he really knows me”), positive behavior (“I would like to 
meet her in real life”), and positive affect (“I feel good”) than observers, and wrote 
fewer thoughts about negative behavior (“I would never go on a date with such a 
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person”), negative affect (“I feel irritated”), and ulterior motives (“He is definitely after 
the money”) than observers; whereas at T2 these differences disappeared or were 
reduced, resulting in a Condition X Time interaction. This interaction was significant in 
all univariate tests, except for negative cognition and negative evaluative judgment, but 
the means for negative evaluative judgment were in the same direction: Targets were 
less negative (“What a slime”) about the ingratiator at T1, whereas at T2, they 
mentioned words concerning slimy and insincere as much as observers. 
 
General Discussion 
Previous research suggests that flattery is like a warm bath that puts targets 
asleep peacefully and prevents them from critical considerations of the ingratiator’s 
motives. The present data indicate that concrete and salient evidence of an ingratiator’s 
insincerity does have the effect of waking them up. In our studies, the target-observer 
difference was replicated: Participants who were ingratiated judged the flatterer as more 
likeable, more sincere, and less slimy than participants who were observing the flatterer. 
In addition, they experienced more positive affect. When participants found out that the 
flatterer said almost the same things to someone else, the difference disappeared. The 
same pattern of results was found for participants’ thoughts, which they wrote down 
before the other ratings were asked. 
 The reading times of the flattering responses suggest that participants who are 
ingratiated engage in simplified processing, taking the flattery at face value. In fact, 
their relatively short reading times is a surprising result, considering that they were 
reading about themselves, and other research suggests that people are more attentive to 
social feedback if it confirms their self-views (Swann, 1987; Swann & Read, 1981) 
which would lead to longer reading times. Note, however, that we compared 
participants who receive positive feedback about themselves with participants who 
receive positive feedback about someone else, and not with participants who receive 
negative feedback about themselves.  
Observers of flattery processed the information longer, even though it was self-
irrelevant, suggesting that they were scrutinizing the content and tried to decide if the 
actor had ulterior motives (cf., Fein, 1996). These results seem in line with an earlier 
study, in which observers requested both positive and negative trait information about a 
flattering actor, thus suggesting they tried to find out if the actor had ulterior motives. In 
contrast, targets requested more positive traits, suggesting they wanted to find out if the 
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actor was sincere (see Chapter 3; Marchand & Vonk, under review b). Presumably, 
targets have no question that the ingratiator is sincere and likeable; they do not need to 
read the description in our study very long, because the behavior is not ambiguous to 
them. Observers, on the other hand, try to determine the evaluative meaning of the 
ingratiator’s behavior, which is reflected in a relatively long elaboration. Note that 
observers’ judgments of the ingratiator were also more moderate, indicating that they 
were sitting on a fence, not knowing whether the ingratiator’s behavior was authentic or 
not; i.e., whether the ingratiator really liked the person s/he responded to, or whether 
s/he was trying to earn extra money by writing a response that the other person would 
surely like. Upon receiving the second, similarly flattering description about someone 
else, observers’ reading times were much faster, suggesting that the ambiguity was 
resolved. Similarly, an earlier scenario study (Vonk, 1998) showed that, once observers 
are suspicious about an actor’s motives, they require very little cognitive effort to 
process information confirming that the actor has an ulterior motive and, subsequently, 
make more extreme negative judgments. 
 Interestingly, targets read the second response as fast as the observers did, 
suggesting that they were also relatively certain about their judgments. Possibly, the 
concrete behavioral information immediately made targets certain about the insincerity 
of the ingratiator. It is also possible that targets actually were still ambiguous and 
uncertain, but they just did not want to elaborate about the ingratiator’s motives, 
because it would make them feel bad. More detailed examination of participants’ open-
ended responses suggests, however, that after the second response, targets were thinking 
the same things as observers: Targets mentioned possible ulterior motives of the 
ingratiator at least as often as observers; and occurrence of words reflecting sliminess 
and insincerity also did not differ between the two. The open responses thus suggest that 
targets were aware of the sliminess and ulterior motives of the ingratiator, and the fast 
reading times indicate that they did not elaborate long about this. Apparently, targets 
acknowledged it would be a rare coincidence if another participant had filled out the 
profile exactly the same as they did. As one target wrote: “… It is obvious that Martin’s 
responses to me and Leonie are almost the same. I doubt that she had the same profile as 
I had; he must be insincere.” Apparently, such inferences about low distinctiveness in 
an actor’s behavior (cf., Kelly, 1967) can be made rather quickly and are reflected in a 
decline in positive responses mentioned in their thoughts listings. 
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 In these studies, we also examined affective variables. Participants who were 
flattered felt better than participants who were observing the flattery; they felt more 
happy, positive, and proud, and less angry and disappointed. As soon as they found out 
that the ingratiator said the same things to another person, they felt the same as 
observers. This suggests that the good feeling participants get from being flattered 
disappears when they become aware that the ingratiator also flatters others. In addition, 
more specific affective ratings revealed that targets felt somewhat fooled and hurt when 
they found out the ingratiator was not sincere, as if they got a slap in the face, whereas 
observers felt the same as before. These affect patterns were also manifested in 
participants’ thought listings, before they were presented with the rating scales: Targets 
at T1 wrote down more often that they felt good, or positive than observers, whereas at 
T2 negative affective terms increased (e.g., “it is a pity”). It is possible that this also 
affected the judgments to some extent: Participants who were ingratiated and found out 
the behavior was not sincere, judged the ingratiator somewhat more negatively than 
observers. This pattern of results suggests that it is less pleasant for participants to find 
out that the actor was not sincere when they did not expect it. 
 Although an internet dating situation may appear to represent a context in which 
people are more prone to be skeptic about flattery, our data suggest otherwise. After the 
first flattering response, targets accepted the flattery without much scrutinizing: They 
judged the actor positively (as indicated in their trait ratings and their own written 
thoughts) and they did not study the flattering response very long. Note that people 
generally give much attention to positive feedback about themselves (Baumeister & 
Cairns, 1992), which should produce long reading times in this situation, yet our targets 
went through the response quicker than observers. Thus, at first, targets are not really 
skeptic about the actor’s flattery. As one participant wrote: “Wow, impressive, that 
someone can really get to know me so well just by reading my profile.” It appears, then, 
that even in a situation in which flattery may be expected, targets were not skeptical. 
Nevertheless, they were willing to judge the actor much less positively after they found 
out s/he was also flattering someone else. 
We may assume that in everyday life, when there is more at stake and people are 
more emotionally involved with others, these effects are more powerful. In our study, 
when targets found out the ingratiator was not sincere, they were still feeling rather 
positive (5 on a 7-point scale), and there was no difference with observers. In the 
thought listings they sometimes mentioned the word “funny” or wrote “hahaha” (which 
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was categorized as positive affect). Also, although they indicated that they felt more 
fooled and hurt than observers, these ratings were still on the lower end of the scale, and 
in the thought listings they used rather mild words indicating negative affect (“too bad,” 
“it is a pity,” “I feel fooled a little”). Similarly, they did not judge the ingratiator as very 
dislikeable. In real life situations, the effects observed here may be more pronounced. 
For example, in the laboratory, participants who were flattered often stayed very 
cheerful after thorough debriefing, whereas in real situations people value sincerity very 
highly and might even get angry when they find out they were played with. When 
someone or something is important to you, additional information revealing insincerity 
may have an enormous impact. 
 People generally prefer to have a positive self-view and are willing to accept 
flattering compliments about the self without much thought (Gordon, 1996; Vonk, 
2002). Previous studies suggest that this motive is more powerful than the need to 
form accurate impressions of an ingratiator or to be cautious because the ingratiator 
could be after the participant’s very own money (Vonk, 2002). Obviously, however, 
reality puts constraints on the self-enhancement principle, and the situation here is a 
case in point. Although people are motivated to like an ingratiator, and are put in a 
good mood by flattery, they are not completely oblivious. When they receive vivid 
and salient evidence that the ingratiating comments are not exclusive and are given to 
others as well, the generally robust and persistent target-observer effect disappears. 
This suggests that targets do want to avoid being fooled. And, for good reason: in real 
life, it can have far-reaching consequences if you don’t. 
 
Endnotes 
1
 “In the Netherlands, where these studies were conducted, there is no general 
word for ingratiation… The verb ‘to slime’ [slijmen] refers to the behavior of 
ingratiating oneself for ulterior motives… As in English, a person who engages in this 
type of behavior is described by the adjective ‘slimy’ [slijmerig]. The word ‘slime’ 
and its conjugations have a negative connotation and are used frequently to describe 
flattery, overly friendly behavior, and brown-nosing. So, for all practical purposes, 
these words refer to the same class of behaviors as the term ingratiation, but they are 
much more informal” (quoted from Vonk, 1998, pp. 849-850). 
 2
 Participants were randomly assigned to the target or observer condition, with 
the exception of 3 participants named Daan or Daantje (the name of the person 
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described in the observer condition), who were always assigned to the target condition 
in order to avoid confusion. 
 
3
 In Studies 4.2 and 4.3, sexual preference, relationship status, and whether or 
not participants had ever met someone on the internet also did not moderate any of the 
results found (Fs < 1), so these variables are not discussed further. 
 4 As in Study 4.1, effects found on the cognitive variable in Studies 4.2 and 4.3 
were also completely mediated by the trait ratings, therefore the cognitive variable 
was removed from subsequent analyses. We did not find evidence for the two separate 
routes as described by Swann et al. (1987). 
 
5
 This subset of variables yielded the highest reliability for Study 4.1 and Study 
4.2 combined. 
 
6
 In this study, more women than men participated. Therefore, on some 
occasions the presence of participants of the other sex was faked by saying that the 
other, male, participants were already seated in the cubicles, and we had been waiting 
for them to start. Comments at debriefing indicated that participants had not questioned 
the presence of other people. 
 
7
 We analyzed the ratings for liking, sincere, and slimy in a multivariate 
analysis (and not as one composed variable), because the traits do not necessarily 
correlate highly. For example, an actor behaving very positively to everybody all the 
time is rated high on likeable but also on slimy (Vonk, 1998). In an analysis where we 
did combine the three traits into one composed measure, the results were the same. 
The other traits used in our studies were included as fillers. 
 
 
  
  
Chapter 5 
When Flattery Does Not Work: 
The Importance of Descriptive Consistency* 
 
People like to be viewed favorably. According to the self-enhancement 
principle, people have the tendency to seek positive or self-enhancing feedback. A 
great deal of empirical evidence demonstrates this motive (e.g., Baumeister, 1982; 
Greenwald, 1980; Jones, 1964; Jones & Pittman, 1982). The self-enhancement 
principle also implies that people want others to treat them in a positive manner 
(Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). For example, people are generally very 
willing to accept flattering compliments (Gordon, 1996). And this makes sense, since 
it is healthier to sustain a positive self-image than a negative one (Taylor & Brown, 
1988). 
 People also like to be viewed accurately. According to the self-verification 
principle, people display a clear preference for self-consistent feedback; i.e., feedback 
that verifies and sustains the image they have of themselves (Swann & Read, 1981). A 
great deal of evidence supports this assumption (e.g., Baumgardner & Brownlee, 
1987; Swann, 1987, 1997). The self-verification principle assumes that people want 
others to perceive them as they perceive themselves (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & 
Gaines, 1987). And this makes sense, because it makes the world a predictable and 
controllable place. 
 Thus, people are simultaneously motivated to self-enhance and self-verify and 
they will try to satisfy both motives when possible (for a review, Sedikides & Strube, 
1997; Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989). Since most people have high self-esteem (Ross 
& Wilson, 2002) people generally like positive feedback, because it is self-enhancing 
and self-verifying at the same time. It is evaluatively positive and thus self-enhancing 
and it is accurate because they have a positive self-view. In line with this reasoning, 
research on ulterior motives has shown that targets of ingratiation are more accepting 
of a flattering response (Jones, 1990) and less sensitive to the possibility of ulterior 
motives (Jones, Stires, Shaver, & Harris, 1968) than observers of ingratiation. 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Marchand, M. A. G., & Vonk, R. (under review c). 
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Presumably, targets accept the flattery without much thought, because it is self-
enhancing and their ego is at stake, whereas observers’ ego is not (Vonk, 2002). 
 The target-observer effect is a robust effect, so by now we have obtained quite 
a lot of evidence for this difference (Marchand & Vonk, under review a, b). For 
example, targets’ ratings of an ingratiator are more positive than observers’ ratings 
(see Chapters 3 and 4). However, there are also limits to the effect. Data from an 
alleged internet dating study show that the target-observer difference disappears when 
participants find out the ingratiator says the same flattering things to someone else, 
thus revealing his or her insincerity (see Chapter 4; Marchand & Vonk, under review 
a). Thus, although targets are motivated to self-enhance, they are not totally oblivious 
to ulterior motives and persuasion tactics. When they discover the flatterer’s 
insincerity, they rate the ingratiator in the same way as observers, and the target-
observer difference disappears. Also, when they become aware of the insincerity 
targets’ mood becomes much less positive than before. 
 It appears that participants need to think the flattery is about them personally. 
Therefore, we decided to examine what happens when the ingratiator flatters 
participants (and not someone else), but the flattery is not self-consistent, e.g., they 
are complimented about a trait they do not possess. Thus, our study is a 2 
(Target/Observer) X 2 (Consistent/Inconsistent with self) design. 
We hypothesize that for observers, who are not being flattered themselves but 
are only observing the flattering behavior, there will be no difference for the two 
flattering responses. Observers in general give more moderate judgments, because 
they are more suspicious about the ingratiator’s motives and are uncertain what to 
think of him or her (cf., Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990, 1993; Vonk, 1999). For targets, 
according to the self-enhancement principle, it is expected that targets judge the 
flatterer as more likeable, regardless of the consistency of the flattery, because the 
response is positive and therefore self-enhancing. Thus, according to the self-
enhancement principle, we should obtain a main effect of Condition, regardless of 
Consistency: Targets judge the ingratiator as more likeable, sincere, and less slimy 
than observers, regardless of the response. According to the self-verification principle, 
targets only judge the flatterer as more likeable after a self-consistent flattering 
response, not after a self-inconsistent one. Thus, according to the self-verification 
principle, we should obtain an interaction effect of Condition X Consistency. 
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 We hypothesize the same logic applies to the affective measure (mood), since 
in our internet dating study affect also resembled the trait ratings (see Chapter 4; 
Marchand & Vonk, under review, a). For the behavior measure, hypotheses are more 
speculative, but we suppose this measure also resembles the trait ratings: If you think 
someone is a likeable person, you are probably more willing to donate your money to 
him or her. We hypothesize the same logic also applies to the behavior measure. 
Thus, according to the self-enhancement principle, we should obtain a main effect of 
Condition: Targets feel better and are more generous (behavior measure) than 
observers, regardless of the flattering response. Whereas, according to the self-
verification principle, we should obtain an interaction effect of Condition X 
Consistency: Targets feel worse and are less generous (behavior measure) after 
reading a self-inconsistent flattering response than after a self-consistent flattering 
response, whereas for observers no difference is expected. 
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an experiment among students who 
consider themselves to be strong in theoretical matters (as opposed to practical) and 
used flattery about either theoretical or practical characteristics. We chose this 
personality trait, because both ends of the scale are evaluative neutral, i.e., both traits 
(theoretical and practical) can be viewed as positive, desirable traits. 
 
Study 5.1 
 
Method 
Overview. Based on a pretest, we selected “theoretical” participants to join 
an experiment. In the experiment, these participants filled out a personality test on the 
basis of which they received a flattering response (stressing theoretical or practical 
qualities). The actor’s response was about their own personality profile (target 
condition) or about the profile of another, third participant (observer condition). Then, 
participants rated the actor on likeability, sincerity, and sliminess. In addition, we 
asked how participants felt, and whether they were willing to give up some of their 
money for the actor. 
Design and participants. The design was a 2 Condition (target vs. 
observer) X 2 Consistency (theoretical vs. practical) between subjects design. 
Participants were 62 undergraduates from the Radboud University Nijmegen with 
different majors (42 targets, 20 observers). We had selected them on the basis of a 
Chapter 5 68
pretest, in which they indicated that they were theoretical (see below). They were paid 
€ 6.00 for participating in this study and an unrelated filler study. 
Procedure and materials. In a different prior study, participants were 
asked to fill out a short questionnaire, in which they rated on a 5-point scale how 
much certain traits were indicative of them. We used three items to select participants 
who consider themselves to be theoretical: “thinker-doer,” “practical-theoretical,” and 
“gathering knowledge-carrying out work;” the other 29 items were from the Big Five 
(McCrae & Costa, 1987) and were used as fillers. Participants who indicated to be 
theoretical (i.e., at least twice rated a 4 or 5 on theoretical items, and not lower than a 
3 on the 3rd item) were invited to join the experiment. 
 A week later participants returned for their appointment and were seated 
behind a computer in individual cubicles. They were led to believe that the computers 
were connected to each other, so that information could be transmitted from one 
participant to the other. Then, they were told that there were two different groups in 
the experiment and they were in the group that would start by filling out a personality 
test. The data of this personality test would allegedly be sent to a participant in the 
other group who would form an impression of them on the basis of this test. In reality, 
we did not use the personality test, but we wanted participants to think that the other 
person would be able to write a response on the basis of several, different aspects of 
their personality, including being theoretical or not. The personality test consisted of 
36 items (among others: interpersonal orientation, Machiavellism, and personal 
values) measured on 7-point Likert scales (1 = disagree completely, 7 = agree 
completely). Examples of these items are: I enjoy making an effort to achieve good 
results; I am more a follower than a leader; when I am dancing, I can let myself go 
entirely. Then, participants were asked six times to choose between three virtues by 
indicating which one was most important to them (e.g., friendship, health, success, 
freedom).  
 In the second part of the experiment, participants received an unrelated filler 
task, during which the alleged other participant was reading their test results and 
writing his or her response. After the filler task, the experiment was resumed. 
 In the third part it was explained that the goal of the experiment was to 
investigate how people form an impression of someone on whom they are dependent. 
Participants read that the participants in the other group would not receive any money 
for their participation. However, although these participants had volunteered to 
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participate for free, they could receive some money if the person they were reading 
and writing about (i.e., the target participants or someone else) decided to give up € 
3.00 of their money. Participants also read that the other person was informed about 
this possibility before he or she wrote the response. This way, we gave the actor an 
ulterior motive for writing a flattering response. 
 Subsequently, participants received a flattering response to a personality test. 
In one condition, the response was about theoretical qualities, in another one it was 
about practical characteristics. Both the name of the flatterer and the name of the 
person whom the description was about (the participant’s own name in the target 
condition; or Frank/Franka in the observer condition) were mentioned in the first line 
of the text. The theoretical version for a male target participant went as follows: 
I am Ronald and I understand that (participant’s name) is in another group and 
that they receive money for this experiment. I find this a bit strange, because 
we don’t get anything for participating, but well, that’s the way it is. I read the 
test results. I think that he’s a very nice guy. Especially, because I get the 
impression that he’s good at thinking seriously about all kinds of things. I also 
think that he can get along great with everyone, because he is focused on 
theory and therefore is good at coming up with new things. I think that I could 
certainly get along great with him myself, because he, just like me, is the type 
of person who likes to use his head. He will definitely make the right decision 
about the money. Also, he seems to be a very nice person to talk to, but 
unfortunately we will probably never meet. He gave a lot of answers that 
appeal to me. All in all, he seems to be an extremely nice person, and gathers 
knowledge just as I do. 
In the practical version, italicized phrases were replaced by similar practical 
descriptions: “he is good at handling things”, “he is focused on practice and therefore 
is good at doing assignments”, “he is the type of person who likes to use his hands”, 
and “likes doing something”. 
 For female participants, the flattering response was given by Laura instead of 
Ronald, thus participants always received a response from someone of the same sex. 
In the observer condition the target’s name was replaced by Frank or Franka (for male 
and female observer participants, respectively). 
 After reading the flattering response, dependent variables were measured. 
These variables consisted of items regarding judgments about the actor (including 
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likeable, sincere, and slimy) and affective variables (mood), in which we asked 
participants to indicate how they felt at that moment (e.g., happy, content, worried). 
These were all measured on 7-point scales (1 = applies not at all; 7 = applies very 
strongly). Further, we asked participants whether they were willing to give up some of 
their money for the actor (€ 3.00). This question was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = 
definitely no, 5 = definitely yes). Finally, they were paid, thanked, and debriefed. 
 
Results 
Two target participants’ data were not included in the analyses because they 
indicated that they were practical in the personality test administered during the 
experiment, so their scores on this dimension had changed. Participants’ gender did 
not affect any of the results and was therefore removed from analyses. 
 A 2 (Condition) X 2 (Consistency) multivariate analysis of variance on ratings 
for likeable, sincere, and slimy produced a main effect of Consistency, F(3, 54) = 
2.83, p < .05, η2 = .14, which was qualified by an interaction effect of Condition X 
Consistency, F(3, 54) = 3.94, p = .01, η2 = .18. Targets judged the actor as more 
likeable (M = 5.20, SD = 1.20), sincere (M = 3.90, SD = 1.21), and less slimy (M = 
5.00, SD = 1.30) when the response was theoretical (i.e., consistent with their self-
image) than when it was practical (M = 3.75, SD = 1.12; M = 3.10, SD = 1.17; M = 
6.05, SD = 1.05, respectively), whereas there was no difference for observers (see 
Table 5.1). There was no main effect of Condition, F < 1. 
 
Table 5.1 
Means and SDs (enclosed in parentheses) for the Condition X Consistency interaction 
effect for the trait ratings likeable, sincere, and slimy 
  Condition  
Dependent Variables Consistency Target Observer Condition X 
Consistency 
Likeable consistent 5.20 (1.20) 4.30 (1.64) F(1, 56) = 2.49† 
 inconsistent 3.75 (1.12) 4.00 (1.63)  
Sincere consistent 3.90 (1.21) 3.90 (1.37) F < 1 
 inconsistent 3.10 (1.17) 3.20 (1.55)  
Slimy consistent 5.00 (1.30) 6.00 (.82) F(1, 56) = 10.05** 
 inconsistent 6.05 (1.05) 4.90 (1.73)  
** p < .01. † p = .12. 
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  Simple main effects showed that for targets, there was a significant effect of 
Consistency, F(3, 36) = 6.78, p < .01, η2 = .36. Targets rated the actor as more 
likeable, F(1, 38) = 15.68, p < .01, η2 = .29, more sincere, F(1, 38) = 4.54, p < .05, η2  
= .11, and less slimy, F(1, 38) = 7.91, p < .01, η2 = .17 after reading a theoretical (i.e., 
consistent with their self-image) response than after reading a practical response. As 
expected, for observers there was no effect of Consistency, F(3, 16) = 1.84, ns; 
indicating that it did not matter for observers whether the flattering response was 
theoretical or practical. 
 Regarding the affective variables, Cronbach’s α for the items happy, content, 
worried, annoyed, confused, sad, and tense (after recoding the latter five) was .82. An 
ANOVA on the mean of this scale produced an interaction effect of Condition X 
Consistency, F(1, 56) = 12.88, p < .01, η2 = .19. There were no main effects, Fs < 
1.67, ns. For targets, a significant effect of Consistency indicated that targets felt 
better after receiving a theoretical (consistent) response (M = 5.74, SD = .67) than 
after a practical (inconsistent) one (M = 4.64, SD = 1.01), F(1, 38) = 16.24, p < .01, η2 
= .30, whereas observers do not feel differently after receiving a theoretical (M = 
5.16, SD = .89) or practical (M = 5.67, SD = .51) flattering response, F(1, 18) = 2.51, 
ns (see Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 
Means and SDs (enclosed in parentheses) for the Condition X Consistency interaction 
effect for the affective variable (mood) 
  Condition  
 Consistency Target Observer Condition X 
Consistency 
Affect consistent 5.74 (.67) 5.16 (.89) F(1, 56) = 12.88** 
  inconsistent 4.64 (1.01) 5.67 (.51)  
** p < .01. 
 
 Finally, we investigated participants’ willingness to give money to the actor. A 
2 (Condition) X 2 (Consistency) ANOVA on the question “Are you willing to give up 
half of your money earned in this experiment to Ronald (Laura)?” produced a main 
effect of Consistency, F(1, 56) = 5.21, p < .05, η2 = .09, which was qualified by a 
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marginally significant interaction effect of Condition X Consistency, F(1, 56) = 3.78, 
p < .06, η2 = .06 (see Table 5.3). Targets were more willing to give up their money 
after the theoretical version (M = 3.35, SD = 1.27) than after the practical version (M 
= 2.10, SD = .91), F(1, 38) = 12.81, p < .01, η2 = .25, whereas observers did not differ 
in their willingness to donate money F < 1. 
 
Table 5.3 
Means and SDs (enclosed in parentheses) for the Condition X Consistency interaction 
effect for the behavioral intention to give up money 
  Condition  
 Consistency Target Observer Condition X 
Consistency 
Willingness to 
give up € 3.00 
consistent 
inconsistent 
3.35 (1.27) 
2.10 (.91) 
2.50 (.97) 
2.40 (1.07) 
F(1, 56) = 3.78† 
† p < .06. 
 
Discussion 
According to the self-enhancement principle, people want to be treated in a 
positive way (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). 
Indeed, people seem to like those who say positive things about them; they like others 
who flatter them (Gordon, 1996; Vonk, 2002). This motive to self-enhance and to 
accept flattery without much thought appears to exist even in the face of an ulterior 
motive (Vonk, 2002). However, ingratiating tactics or other manipulation intents 
(such as flattery) need to be attuned to the target or else they can backfire (Jones, 
1964; Schwarzwald, Raz, & Zvibel, 1979). This is also demonstrated in the present 
study. Targets of ingratiation rated an ingratiator much less positively when the 
flattery was about self-inconsistent characteristics than when it was about self-
consistent ones. They also felt worse after the inconsistent response and were less 
willing to give up their money. It appears that people want others to perceive them as 
they perceive themselves. Even when the flattery is evaluatively positive, it is 
important that there is a descriptive fit. The content should be accurate and compatible 
with the self-concept, if not, even targets who receive a positive response view the 
flattery as negative and “slimy”. 
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 Although the target-observer difference was in the expected direction for all 
dependent measures, it was only significant for the affective measure. A possible 
explanation for this is that targets of the flattering response rated the ingratiator 
somewhat less positive, because the flattery was too specific. Research on personality 
has shown that people accept statements that are generalized and vague (ambiguous) 
as accurate self-descriptions (cf., the Barnum effect: Forer, 1949; for a review: 
Dickson & Kelly, 1985; Furnham & Schofield, 1986), because people can readily find 
confirming behavioral evidence for diverse and generalized aspects of the self 
(Davies, 1997), and apparently are gullible in accepting such personality feedback 
(Marks & Seeman, 1962; Meehl, 1956). In contrast, we used feedback that was 
concrete and unambiguous and therefore may have been rated less positively than in 
our previous studies (see Chapters 3 and 4; Marchand & Vonk, under review a, b). 
Moreover, during the experiment, targets filled out a personality test with 36 items 
and only received a response about being theoretical, whereas they may have 
expected other parts to be included in the response. Another explanation is that 
observers were basking in reflected glory (cf., Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, 
Freeman, & Sloan, 1976). Observers may have been associating with the person who 
was flattered, because they possessed the same personality characteristic (theoretical). 
This way, the observer could benefit from the flattering response that was about those 
characteristics and rate the ingratiator somewhat more positive than is found in other 
experiments. 
 One could argue that the effects we found can be attributed to differences in 
the two descriptions. Although the versions are almost identical, it still may have been 
that the theoretical version is more positive than the practical one. However, observers 
did not differ in their judgments of the ingratiator whether a theoretical or practical 
response is given, which rules out this explanation. 
 Since for observers in general it does not really matter which flattering 
response they receive (viz., there are no significant effects of Consistency), observers 
reading the theoretical and practical response can also be combined into one large 
control group. Interestingly, observers’ ratings as one group, fall in between the two 
targets groups, such that a linear trend emerges for all three trait ratings; likeable: F(1, 
59) = 12.04, p < .01; sincere: F(1, 59) = 3.86, p = .05; slimy: F(1, 59) = 6.84, p = .01. 
Targets who read the flattering response consistent with their self-image form the 
most positive impression of the ingratiator, followed by observers who give more 
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moderate judgments; finally, targets who read the inconsistent flattery are least 
positive.  
 The affective measure (mood) shows the same linear pattern; F(1, 57) = 17.56, 
p < .01. Targets feel better after a consistent flattering response than after an 
inconsistent one, with the observers falling in between. Although the targets who read 
a practical response, received positive flattery, they feel worse than observers, 
because the response is not in accordance with their self-view (cf., Swann, 1997). 
Finally, the behavior measure (or at least behavioral intent) reveals the same pattern 
of results; F(1, 57) = 13.64, p < .01. Targets are somewhat willing to give up half of 
their own money to the flatterer when he or she is flattering about self-consistent 
characteristics, but are unwilling to give it up when he or she is flattering about 
practical qualities; again, with the observers falling in between. In sum, in favor of the 
self-verification principle, not only the evaluative meaning, but also the content of a 
flattering response is important, even in case of these unfamiliar people who would 
never get to meet each other. 
 Although general positive flattery may be accepted without much thought, 
because it tickles one’s vanity, there are limits to this need for self-enhancement. In 
recent studies (see Chapter 4; Marchand & Vonk, under review a) data suggest that, 
although people were motivated to like an ingratiator, they did not hesitate to rate the 
ingratiator negatively when they found out the flattery was not really about them. This 
is also what happened in the present study. Although receiving inconsistent, positive 
feedback can lead to the acceptance of the feedback, because it is evaluative positive 
and therefore self-enhancing, it appears that, in favor of the self-verification principle, 
the content of the feedback is just as much important. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
 
In the current thesis we investigated the impression people formed of someone 
with an ulterior motive. We compared what sort of information targets and observers 
requested about a flattering person and how this information subsequently altered 
their impression. This way, we came to a better understanding of targets’ and 
observers’ impressions of someone with an ulterior motive. Previous studies on 
suspicion of ulterior motives have typically presented fixed information to 
participants (Fein, 1996; Vonk, 2002) or were limited by investigating only observers’ 
impression of an ingratiator (although in some studies participants imagined 
themselves to be the person in the interaction) (Campbell, 1995; DeCarlo, 2005). In 
the current empirical chapters, the focus was first on what kind of information 
participants requested, followed by an investigation of what happened when we 
provided perceivers with this information. 
 An overview of the results for each chapter will be given, I will discuss 
limitations of our research, and provide alternative explanations, after which 
suggestions for future research are made. I will end this discussion with some final, 
concluding remarks. 
 In Chapter 2, we used a thinking-aloud technique (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) 
and found people can discover ulterior motives or insincerity quite quickly, even 
though we provided them moderately informative cues. This is remarkable since 
detecting deception is rather rare (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 
1999; DePaulo & Friedman, 1998; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Malone & DePaulo, 
2001). Even information about the flattered person evoked changes in suspicion, 
which is interesting, since people normally have the tendency to focus on the actor 
and ignore other situational information. Moreover, the cues used in these studies 
were based on peoples’ open responses (in a pretest) to the question “what do you 
want to know”, instead of being created by the researchers. We used three different 
scenarios that together demonstrate how the process of becoming suspicious unfolds 
over time as people grapple with the possibility that someone has ulterior motives, 
and then become convinced. Thus, based on information people requested, our 
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findings show that the positive evaluation of the actor decreases as more information 
indicating ulterior motives is received. At the same time, our results for the first time 
show how the suspicious mindset emerges and progresses. Confirming our 
hypotheses, a linear effect for general impression and a quadratic effect for suspicion 
emerged. 
 In Chapter 3, we moved on to include targets of someone with an ulterior 
motive in our studies. As expected, Study 3.1A replicated the target-observer 
difference for ratings of a flattering actor: Targets judged the actor as more likeable, 
more sincere, and less slimy than observers. In addition to these results, we used Skov 
and Sherman’s method (1986) from the hypothesis testing literature and found that 
targets and observers differ in what sort of information they request about a flattering 
person. Targets preferred personality information indicating the flatterer is sincere, 
whereas observers requested both personality information reflecting sincerity and 
sliminess, suggesting they were more suspicious. For targets, the effect emerged 
regardless of their level of self-esteem, suggesting that they wanted the flatterer to be 
sincere, because their ego is at stake. 
Next, in Study 3.1B the requested information was actually presented and 
results showed that targets did not persist in their positive impression when they 
received negative trait information about the actor. Although it would be beneficial 
for targets, whose self-esteem was boosted by the flatterer, to disregard the negative 
trait information from a self-enhancing point of view, both observers and targets 
implemented the requested information when they received it and changed their 
impression.  
 In Chapter 4, studies were conducted in an alleged dating situation, in which 
skepticism towards flattery may be anticipated. However, as in Chapter 3, targets still 
rated the flatterer as more likeable, more sincere, and less slimy than observers, 
showing the robustness of the target-observer difference even in a skeptic situation. 
Moreover, targets’ short reading times of the flattering response suggest they engaged 
in simplified processing and they thoughtlessly accepted the flattery. In contrast, 
observers appeared to be scrutinizing the flattering message to find out if the actor had 
ulterior motives. This is in support of the results found in Chapter 3, in which 
observers were considering ulterior motives and requested both sincere and slimy 
personality traits.  
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When receiving the second, similarly flattering response about someone else 
(i.e., the flatterer’s behavior was low in distinctiveness) both targets and observers 
rated the actor much less positive. As in Chapter 3, both targets and observers 
implemented the information about the flatterer but target-observer differences 
remained. These differences, however, can be attributed to an anchoring effect 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), as suggested by Study 4.3, in which the target-
observer difference disappeared entirely when ratings were only given once. Fast 
reading times of this second response further suggest targets did not elaborate long 
about the second description and were relatively certain about their judgment. Thus 
both targets and observers quickly made up their mind and gave negative ratings.  
We also measured affective ratings: At first targets felt much better than 
observers, whereas after the second response targets felt the same as observers. More 
specific affective ratings revealed that targets felt somewhat fooled and hurt when 
they found out the flatterer was also flattering someone else. In addition, targets’ 
thought listings (measured before the other ratings) resembled observers’ open 
responses, suggesting they were having the same thoughts as observers. Summarizing 
the results of Chapter 4, we can state that both targets and observers can readily detect 
ulterior motives. 
 In Chapter 5, we found empirical evidence that, corroborating the results in 
Study 4.3, there are limits to targets’ need for self-enhancement. More specifically, in 
the face of an ulterior motive, the content of a flattering response is important. As 
hypothesized, targets who received a self-consistent response judged the flatterer as 
more likeable, more sincere, and less slimy than targets who received a self-
inconsistent response. Also, they felt better and were more willing to give up half of 
their money after the self-consistent response. Interestingly, for all dependent 
variables, observers (taken together as one group) fell in between the two target 
groups such that a linear trend emerged with targets after a positive self-consistent 
response being most positive, observers being less positive, and targets after a positive 
self-inconsistent response being least positive. This shows flattery can also result in 
negative consequences. Flattery needs to be accurate and compatible with targets’ 
self-concept or else it may backfire. 
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Strengths and Limitations 
Our main focus has been on ratings of the traits likeable, sincere, and slimy, 
because we think that these traits are involved most in discovering ulterior motives. 
For instance, a person who is seen as sincere (a highly valued trait; cf., Toro-Morn & 
Sprecher, 2003) tends to be seen as likeable as well. As research has already shown, 
ratings on likeability and sliminess need not correlate, because someone can be seen 
as likeable and slimy at the same time (Vonk, 1998). We assessed these three traits in 
our studies to investigate the entire scope of the process. Nevertheless, other 
researchers may think that other traits are more important. Therefore we sometimes 
added other, somewhat related traits, such as general impression (positive, negative) 
or sly and manipulative. Results from these traits showed similar patterns as the other 
traits, but effects were weaker; thus, results were most consistent for the traits we 
focus on, corroborating our view, that these traits are most important. Moreover, filler 
traits (e.g., intelligent or spontaneous) did not reveal the same effects, again 
suggesting that only more specific traits are involved. This also rules out the 
possibility that target-observer differences can be explained by a general halo effect, 
the tendency to evaluate all components of a person in the same way once a general 
evaluation is formed (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; cf., e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1987).  
 Besides the general halo effect, another possible alternative explanation is that 
our results may be due to the reciprocity norm, which means that people return a 
positive response with a positive impression (Gouldner, 1960). This explanation is 
undermined by our data from the internet dating study. In this study the actor gave a 
positive response twice, but was negatively evaluated after the second response, even 
though it was evaluative positive. In addition, in the study described in Chapter 5, 
positive inconsistent feedback did not result in a positive impression of the actor. 
People obviously did not feel the need to be polite or the need to reciprocate the 
actor’s positive response. Based on these studies in which only positive information 
was given, the reciprocity norm can be ruled out as an alternative explanation.  
 A limitation of our studies is that we only looked at one kind of ulterior 
motive, viz. personal gain (an instrumental ulterior motive), whereas people who 
deceive may do so for various reasons, such as avoiding personal loss (also an 
instrumental reason), creating or maintaining personal relationships (an interpersonal 
objective), or enhancing their public image (an identity objective) (Buller & Burgoon, 
1994). Note however that in our internet dating study, participants wrote down 
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ulterior motives such as “desperately wanting a date,” or “wanting sex,” 
demonstrating we did not exclusively investigate instrumental reasons. This is 
remarkable, since these self-generated ulterior motives were not mentioned anywhere, 
whereas the motive of gaining extra money was highly accessible, because it was 
explicitly described in the instructions. This indicates varying reasons for flattery may 
produce the same effects, even when it involves self-generated ulterior motives. This 
supposition, however, is left for future research to examine. 
 Another limitation involved the comparability of information knowledge for 
targets and observers. For instance, targets received a flattering response that was 
evaluative consistent with their self-image; on the other hand, observers did not have 
an existing expectancy of the person being ingratiated, so the flattery did not match 
anything that was already known. Observers might have judged the flatterer more 
neutral simply because they lacked information (cf., Vonk, 2002). To meet these 
objections, we ran another study in which we gave observers information about the 
person who was flattered, so they had an informed impression of the actor. We used a 
so-called yoked design study: A target wrote a short text about him- or herself and 
then allegedly an ingratiator wrote a positive response based on this text. In reality, 
everyone received the same positive response written by the researcher. After reading 
this response, the target rated the actor. Hereafter, an unacquainted observer received 
the same positive response together with the target’s short text, so that the observer 
knew on what information the response was based. Results again showed a target-
observer difference, indicating that the difference is not due to differences in 
information knowledge and this explanation can be ruled out. 
 We used a broad variety of ways to conduct our research, which can be seen as 
the strength of our research. By using many different research methods and settings 
and still finding cohesive results, we are showing the generality of our results. We 
used several different dependent variables (e.g., trait ratings, thoughts, behavior 
intention, affect, and open responses), had different situational settings, and based our 
studies on different research areas: All resulting in a better understanding of what 
impression people form of someone with an ulterior motive.  
Moreover, individual characteristics (e.g., the need for cognition, dispositional 
trust, narcissism) did not seem to be important in discovering ulterior motives. 
Although one could argue these traits may play a substantial part in influencing the 
results, in Vonk’s studies (2002), dominance orientation, narcissism, self-esteem 
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etcetera, did not show any evidence for this. We ourselves also did not find any 
evidence. And it was not for a lack of trying: In several studies we measured need for 
cognition and dispositional trust (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Rotter, 1967; respectively) 
but these did not moderate any of the results. The only result we found was a gender 
difference: In Study 4.3, men wanted to go out with a flattering woman more than 
women wanted to go out with a flattering man. It appears that our results describe a 
general human propensity. Though we found the target-observer difference in 
impression formation can be robust, we also showed that people in general are readily 
willing to change this impression in the face of additional evidence of an ulterior 
motive. And this finding may not be so surprising since sincerity is highly valued in 
our Dutch society, as suggested by a questionnaire held amongst more than 2,000 
respondents in the CentERpanel (a representative sample of the Dutch society). These 
respondents wrote down most often that “sincere” is the most positive personality 
trait. When people find out someone is not sincere this will influence their impression. 
 
Future Research 
 Note however that we mainly focused on intentional inferences. People who 
are ingratiated explicitly rated the ingratiator as more likeable than someone 
observing the ingratiation. However, this does not mean that, spontaneously, the 
ulterior motive is not inferred. As suggested by Ham and Vonk (2003) spontaneous 
trait and spontaneous situational inferences can co-occur (cf., Reeder, Kumar, 
Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & Lawrence, 2004). 
Thus, both the ulterior motive (situational inference) and the dispositional inference 
likeable can spontaneously be activated, but targets are subsequently more motivated 
to ignore this situational inference. To investigate underlying processes in discovering 
ulterior motives by targets and observers, our line of research could be expanded by 
using more unobtrusive measures (reaction time studies or other). These factors were 
considered beyond the scope of this thesis, but can be useful for future research 
involving ulterior motives and impression formation. 
Also, we conducted our research in the Netherlands, a Western individualistic 
oriented country. Note that there are cultures in which it is accepted or even 
normative that people are overly flattering, as well as there are situations in which 
self-presentation is appropriate. For example, during a job interview an applicant is 
expected to be self-presenting by being very enthusiastic about the new job. Some 
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personality tests even take into account such norms; such as the Achievement 
Motivation Test (Hermans, 1970) which has a different score coding table when it is 
used in selection situations. Research suggests cultures differ in the motives for 
deception. Members of collectivistic cultures use deception to meet a social 
obligation, whereas members of individualistic cultures use deception to secure their 
individual goals (Rodríguez, 1996). We think that although these reasons and schemas 
for deception or flattery can differ between cultures, underlying processes of detecting 
it may be the same. It is conceivable that what goes for deception also goes for 
flattery for ulterior motives. Since deception is often defined as “a message 
knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the 
receiver” (Buller & Burgoon, 1996, p. 205), according to the definition, flattery for 
ulterior motives may also be considered a form of deception. Future research may 
further explore whether our results about targets’ and observers’ impression formation 
can be generalized to other cultures as well. 
In our studies, we presented people with positive textual feedback, but there 
are also other (non textual) ways to ingratiate oneself or to persuade; for example, 
through speed of speech, head movements, smiling (Miller, Maruyama, Beaber & 
Valone, 1976), mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and so on. Although we did use 
smiley faces in the alleged internet dating study, we never had real interactions, which 
may even make the effects we have shown more powerful. Meta-analyses by 
Zuckerman and Driver (1985) and DePaulo et al. (2003) identified and categorized 
some nonverbal cues pointing to deception, which can help people discover ulterior 
motives (cf., Vrij, 2000). Instead making discovery of ulterior motives more difficult 
DeTurck and Miller (1985) found also truthful senders display nonverbal behavior 
associated with deception. Also, Dunbar, Raminez, and Burgoon (2003) stated that 
the more visual information available, the less accurate the detection of deceit is. 
Whether real interactions improve or deteriorate detecting deception by targets and 
observers remains to be examined. 
It is hypothesized that the cognitive and behavioral energy devoted to 
upholding a conversation make conversational partners inferior lie detectors 
compared to passive interrogators, because they face a more demanding task than do 
people passively taking part of the same communication (Burgoon et al., 1996; 
Forrest and Feldman, 2000). For this reason, targets of ingratiation may be less apt at 
detecting ulterior motives than observers. This hypothesis is also partly based on the 
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notion of the honesty effect; that is, an assumption of truthfulness is a part of general 
conversation maxims; hence, deception ought to be a less frequent attribution by 
conversational partners (targets) than by passive interrogators (observers) (Vrij, 
2000). Some researchers have already noted the low levels of natural suspicion 
between communicators that are extremely familiar with each other and particularly 
between people in intimate relationships (McCornack & Levine, 1990; Levine & 
McCornack, 1992) suggesting it may be more difficult for targets to discover ulterior 
motives in real interactions. 
 In general, we think it is important to recognize that two competing 
mechanisms are at hand for targets; the motivation to detect and the motivation to 
neglect ulterior motives. In real life, the motivation to neglect ulterior motives may 
become more pronounced than in our laboratory, because there is more at stake (e.g., 
a friendship, a happy marriage, etcetera). People may thus ignore signs indicating 
ulterior motives; i.e., they only see that the other person smiles at them and further 
ignore nonverbal cues revealing deception. This way, they feel liked and boost their 
self-esteem. On the other hand, targets may be more motivated to detect ulterior 
motives in real life, because an erroneous inference can engender costs in daily life 
and they want to avoid being duped or deceived. Since we have shown ulterior 
motives can be detected even in situations in the laboratory, which are personally less 
relevant, we hypothesize self-enhancement, by accepting flattery uncritically, only 
works up to a certain point, until costs (of being duped) become too high, then 
detection occurs. This suggests there is a trade-off between the motivation to detect 
and the motivation to neglect ulterior motives. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis we looked at differences in targets’ and observers’ impression 
formation and impression change when they become suspicious of ulterior motives. A 
unique asset of our studies is that we provided information people requested 
themselves. It appears that when flattery is more general and can be applied to 
everyone, more associative processes are involved (it just feels good) and the flattery 
is accepted without much thought. The flattery “makes sense,” and is not critically 
processed. People who are being flattered form a more favorable impression of the 
flatterer and feel better than someone observing the flattery, even when the flatterer 
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has an ulterior motive for the behavior. Indeed, ingratiation or flattery is a form of 
deception that has proven to be rather effective. 
However, this does not mean a positive behavior always works in favor of the 
flatterer. We found that when people become suspicious, this can also result in the 
opposite effect, and this suspicion can simply be awakened by moderately informative 
cues. Our recent studies have begun to show some of these downside effects of 
flattery for ulterior motives (Marchand & Vonk, under review a and c). When people 
find out someone is not sincere, they feel less positive, more fooled and hurt, and 
judge the flatterer more negatively. They are aware that the flatterer was just trying to 
influence them and make much less positive attributions. This shows there are limits 
to self-enhancement effects. People who were flattered and became suspicious of the 
other person’s motives may even judge the flatterer more negatively than people 
observing the situation, because they feel personally duped, but this finding is still 
rather speculative. 
 We do think there are many different situations in which a general, overly 
flattering (though subtle) response may be beneficial, for instance for improving 
social interactions, such as when you flatter your partner after a nice meal, flatter a 
friend after a new haircut, or flatter your boss to get ahead. However, it is also good to 
bear in mind there are limitations; e.g., workplace problems with colleagues when you 
flatter the boss too much; cross-cultural misunderstandings; being seen as a hoaxer 
when trying too hard to sell something, or having a reputation as the desperate guy 
stalking every girl in the pub. Ulterior motives can be readily detected and flattery 
thus does not always work. 
Imagine the following situation (based on personal experience). A group of 
teens are talking and hanging around. One of the boys lights up a cigarette when his 
girlfriend points out he has promised her to stop smoking. She is angry and starts to 
walk away, so he quickly says: “Please come back; if you want me to stop smoking, 
of course I will stop, but only for you.” And with a lot of drama and big gestures he 
puts out his cigarette. “See, I immediately throw away my cigarette.” The girl is not 
convinced. “Please, come back. You know I’d do anything for you, I think you are 
great. I love you and you know it. Here, I throw away all the other cigarettes too. The 
girl hesitates. “You know what, I will throw away the lighter, so you know I mean it 
this time.” And he throws the lighter in the trashcan. She gives in and they make up 
with a kiss and hold hands; she has a smile on her face. After a while the boy goes 
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home and there he immediately goes to his room and opens his drawer; it is filled with 
packets of cigarettes and at least 15 lighters. He lights a cigarette and mumbles “that 
tastes good...” 
 The story described above can repeat itself several times and for a while 
everything goes well. The girl is happy, because her boyfriend gives up smoking for 
her and her ego is enhanced. However, when she finds out that he is not sincere (and 
probably never intended to stop smoking) she feels like a fool for trusting him. Her 
ego is damaged and he immediately falls from his pedestal. In general, people value 
sincerity and we all want truth in our lives. But we also want to have smooth, positive 
interactions and we like being popular and loved. Flattering another person helps us 
smoothen the interaction and some sliminess indeed has positive effects. Just like the 
girl really loves her boyfriend for giving up smoking for her. But how does she feel 
when discovering it was all for an ulterior motive… 
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Summary 
 
In society, there is a common assumption that people should be honest. 
Already as children we are taught about the importance of honesty: We tell the truth 
because it is the right thing to do. However, we also want to have smooth interactions 
with others and we know that telling a few white lies helps to achieve this goal. Also, 
we readily flatter other persons to improve our interactions. People who are being 
flattered generally form a positive impression of the flatterer. But what happens when 
the flatterer only flatters for an ulterior motive? What if he or she has a hidden 
agenda? 
In the current thesis we investigate the impression people form of someone 
with an ulterior motive. What sort of information do they request about the other 
person and how does this information subsequently alter their impression? So far, it 
has never been investigated what kind of information perceivers their selves request 
when they are aware of the possibility of ulterior motives. Interesting is whether 
ulterior motives are detected at all and whether people being flattered (targets) and 
people seeing others being flattered (observers) differ in implementing information 
about a flatterer’s ulterior motives. 
 In the first methodological chapter, we found that observers can readily detect 
ulterior motives, even if detection is based on moderate information. We used a 
thinking aloud method to demonstrate how the process of becoming suspicious 
unfolds over time as people grapple with the possibility that someone has ulterior 
motives, and then become convinced. The present research uniquely showed how this 
mindset emerges and progresses as more information casting a negative light on the 
behavior is received. Perceivers initially certain of their positive evaluation soon 
began to doubt the actor’s motives (i.e., they became suspicious). As more 
information was presented, they became progressively more certain that the actor 
indeed had ulterior motives, until finally they were certain. Thus, our findings show 
that the positive evaluation of the actor decreases linearly as more information 
indicating ulterior motives is received, whereas a quadratic effect emerged for 
suspicion. 
 In Chapter 3, we moved on to include targets of someone with an ulterior 
motive (i.e., the flatterer is being overly positive to gain money) in our studies. As 
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hypothesized, we replicated the target-observer difference: Targets rated the flatterer 
as more likeable, more sincere, and less slimy than observers. Then, we used Skov 
and Sherman’s method from hypothesis literature to inquire how (suspicious) 
perceivers select information about this flattering person. People could choose from 
several different traits reflecting sincerity or sliminess. As expected, observers do not 
have a clear preference for information reflecting sincerity or sliminess of the 
flatterer. In contrast, targets requested more traits indicative of sincerity. Extending 
previous research we examined how the requested information subsequently affected 
targets’ and observers’ impressions. In Study 3.1B, targets and observers 
implemented the information they received and both changed their impression, 
regardless whether the information was positive or negative. This is surprising, since 
it would be beneficial for targets’ ego to disregard the negative trait information. 
Thus, suspicion of ulterior motives is a way to encourage healthy skepticism that can 
facilitate even the acceptance of evidence that is not preferred or not convenient. 
 In line with the first results from Chapter 3, we replicated the target-observer 
difference in Chapter 4 in an alleged dating situation. This is a situation, in which 
skepticism towards flattery may be anticipated and therefore shows the robustness of 
the effect. Also in support of the results of Chapter 3, targets’ short reading times of 
the flattering response suggest they engaged in simplified processing and they 
thoughtlessly accepted the flattery, whereas observers appeared to be scrutinizing the 
flattering message to find out if the actor had ulterior motives. 
 Next, participants received a second similarly flattering response about 
someone else (imagine a slimy guy in a singles bar trying the same pick-up line on 
each woman sitting at the bar) and both targets and observers implemented this 
information about the flatterer and rated him or her much less positive. Fast reading 
times of this second response suggest observers’ ambiguity was resolved. 
Interestingly, targets also did not elaborate long about the second description and 
were relatively certain about their judgment. Apparently, both targets and observers 
quickly made up their mind, were aware of the sliminess and ulterior motives of the 
flatterer, and gave negative ratings. More detailed examination of open-ended 
responses suggests, that after the second response, targets were thinking the same 
things as observers. 
In addition, we measured affective ratings: At first targets felt much better 
than observers, whereas after the second response targets felt the same as observers. 
Summary 99
More specific affective ratings revealed that targets felt somewhat fooled and hurt 
when they found out the flatterer was also flattering someone else. It appears that 
even in a situation in which flattery may be expected (such as a dating situation), 
targets were not skeptical at first. Nevertheless, they were willing to judge the flatterer 
much less positively after they found out he or she was also flattering someone else. 
Summarizing the results of Chapter 4, we can state that both targets and observers can 
readily detect ulterior motives. 
 In Chapter 5, we demonstrated that manipulation through flattery needs to be 
attuned to the target or else it can backfire. Corroborating results in Study 4.3, there 
are limits to targets’ need for self-enhancement. Targets who receiving concrete 
flattery, rated the flatterer much less positively when the flattery was about self-
inconsistent characteristics than when it was about self-consistent ones. They also felt 
worse after the inconsistent response and were less willing to give up their money. 
Interestingly, for all dependent variables, observers (taken together as one group) fell 
in between the two target groups such that a linear trend emerged with targets after a 
positive self-consistent response being most positive, observers being less positive, 
and targets after a positive self-inconsistent response being least positive. This shows 
flattery needs to be compatible with targets’ self-concept or else it may result in 
negative consequences. 
 
  
  
Samenvatting 
 
In onze maatschappij is het algemene uitgangspunt dat mensen eerlijk moeten zijn. 
Als kinderen leren we al over het belang van eerlijkheid. We vertellen de waarheid 
omdat dat het juiste is om te doen. We willen echter ook graag soepele interacties met 
anderen hebben en we weten dat de omgang met anderen vaak beter verloopt als we 
kleine leugentjes vertellen. Ook vleien we anderen om meer positieve interacties te 
hebben. Mensen die gevleid worden, vormen namelijk een positieve indruk van de 
vleier. Maar wat gebeurt er als iemand alleen maar aardig is vanwege een verborgen 
motief of als iemand een bijbedoeling heeft met zijn gedrag? 
 In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we de indruk die mensen hebben van iemand 
die een bijbedoeling heeft. Welke informatie willen mensen graag hebben over de 
andere persoon en hoe verandert hun indruk als ze deze informatie vervolgens 
krijgen? Tot op heden is er nog nooit onderzoek gedaan naar wat voor soort 
informatie waarnemers willen ontvangen wanneer ze zich bewust zijn van een 
verborgen agenda. Interessant is om te weten of de bijbedoelingen überhaupt ontdekt 
worden (aangezien het juist goed voelt om alles klakkeloos aan te nemen als waar). 
Bovendien is het interessant of de mensen die gevleid worden (de targets) en de 
mensen die zien dat een ander gevleid wordt (de observers) van elkaar verschillen in 
het implementeren van de informatie over de bijbedoelingen van een vleier. 
 In het eerste methodologische hoofdstuk vonden we dat observers de 
bijbedoelingen ook kunnen ontdekken zélfs als ze slechts matig informatieve 
informatie ontvingen. We lieten respondenten hardop denken om te onderzoeken hoe 
het proces precies verloopt: als mensen achterdochtig worden, vervolgens de 
mogelijkheid overwegen dat er verborgen bedoelingen zijn en uiteindelijk zeker zijn 
van hun zaak. Het huidige onderzoek toont als enige hoe deze manier van denken 
ontstaat en zich verder ontwikkelt wanneer mensen extra informatie ontvangen die 
een negatief licht werpt op de situatie (op het vleiende gedrag). Mensen waren in het 
begin zeker van hun positieve evaluatie, maar begonnen de motieven van de ander al 
snel te wantrouwen (ze werden achterdochtig). Naarmate er meer informatie 
aangeboden werd, waren ze er steeds meer van overtuigd dat de ander verborgen 
bedoelingen had, totdat ze uiteindelijk weer zeker waren (nu van een negatievere 
evaluatie). Onze bevindingen tonen dus aan dat de indruk van de vleier lineair 
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afneemt (de positieve indruk wordt steeds negatiever), terwijl de achterdocht 
kwadratisch verloopt. 
 In Hoofdstuk 3 keken we in onze studies ook naar targets van een vleier met 
een verborgen bedoeling (de vleier wil graag geld verdienen door extra positief te 
doen). Zoals verwacht, repliceerden we het target-observer effect: targets 
beoordeelden een vleier als aardiger, oprechter en minder slijmerig dan observers. 
Vervolgens gebruikten we de methode van Skov en Sherman (1986) uit de literatuur 
over hypothesen toetsen om erachter te komen hoe waarnemers informatie kiezen 
over de vleier. Mensen konden uit verschillende persoonlijkheid eigenschappen 
kiezen die indicatief waren voor oprechtheid of slijmerigheid. Observers hadden geen 
voorkeur voor de eigenschappen die wezen op oprechtheid of slijmerigheid. Als 
uitbreiding op dit onderzoek bekeken we hoe de informatie over de gevraagde 
eigenschappen vervolgens de indruk van targets en observers beïnvloedde. Uit de 
resultaten van Studie 3.1B kwam naar voren dat zowel targets als observers hun 
indruk van de vleier lieten beïnvloeden door de informatie over de vleier. Informatie 
die erop wees dat de vleier oprecht was, leidde tot een positievere indruk; informatie 
die wees op een slijmerd, tot een negatievere indruk. Dit kan als verrassend 
beschouwd worden als men bedenkt dat het voor targets veel prettiger zou zijn om de 
negatieve informatie te negeren en te denken dat de vleier het oprecht meende, dit zou 
het welzijn van de target namelijk verhogen. Het lijkt er echter op dat achterdocht een 
gezonde manier is om informatie sceptisch te bekijken, zelfs als deze informatie 
eigenlijk niet gewenst is of niet goed uitpakt voor de persoon. 
 In overeenstemming met de resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 3 repliceerden we het 
target-observer effect in Hoofdstuk 4 met een dating studie. Targets beoordeelden de 
vleier positiever dan de waarnemers. Aangezien je in een situatie waarin je gaat daten 
enige scepsis ten aanzien van vleierij zou kunnen verwachten, toont deze studie de 
robuustheid van het effect aan. Bovendien suggereren de korte leestijden van de 
targets dat ze de vleiende beschrijving niet al te diepgaand verwerkten en dat ze de 
vleierij accepteerden zonder er veel over na te denken. De observers daarentegen 
leken de boodschap langer te bestuderen om erachter te komen of de vleier 
bijbedoelingen had. 
 Daarna kregen de deelnemers een tweede, soortgelijke vleiende reactie van 
dezelfde persoon, maar nu ging deze over iemand anders (zoals een jongen die in de 
kroeg bij iedere vrouw dezelfde slijmerige openingszin gebruikt). Zowel targets als 
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observers beoordeelden de vleier na deze extra informatie veel minder positief. De 
korte leestijd van de observers suggereert dat ze niet meer twijfelden. Vreemd genoeg 
dachten ook de targets niet lang over de beschrijving na. Het lijkt te zijn dat zowel de 
observers als de targets zich redelijk snel bewust waren van de bijbedoelingen van de 
vleier en beiden gaven negatieve oordelen. Uit de open antwoorden kunnen we 
afleiden dat de targets na de tweede reactie dezelfde gedachten hadden als de 
observers. 
 Om meer inzicht te krijgen in wat er zich afspeelt, hebben we ook gevraagd 
naar gevoelens (affectieve maten). Eerst voelden targets zich beter dan observers, 
maar na de tweede vleiende reactie was dit verschil verdwenen. Meer specifieke 
emoties toonden aan dat targets zich enigszins bedrogen en gekwetst voelden nadat ze 
erachter kwamen dat de vleier ook zo positief was tegen iemand anders. Hoewel 
targets dus in eerste instantie de vleierij zonder enige scepsis accepteerden (zelfs in 
een dating situatie waarin je vleierij mag verwachten), waren ze bereid de vleier veel 
minder positief te beoordelen na de tweede reactie. Kortom, de resultaten uit 
Hoofdstuk 4 laten zien dat zowel targets als observers verborgen bedoelingen zonder 
al te veel moeite kunnen ontdekken.  
 In Hoofdstuk 5 tonen we aan dat de vleierij betrekking moet hebben op de 
target, anders kan het een averechts effect hebben. In overeenstemming met Studie 
4.3 vinden we ook in de studie in Hoofdstuk 5 dat er grenzen zijn aan de behoefte tot 
zelfverheffing. Targets die concrete vleierij ontvingen over eigenschappen die 
inconsistent waren met hun zelfbeeld beoordeelden de vleier veel minder positief dan 
targets die gevleid werden over concrete eigenschappen die wel overeen kwamen met 
het zelfbeeld. Tevens voelde deze eerste groep zich slechter en was minder bereid om 
geld af te staan aan de vleier. Als groep vallen waarnemers met hun oordelen wat 
betreft alle afhankelijke variabelen precies in tussen de twee target groepen. Er 
ontstaat zo een lineaire trend waarin targets het meest positief zijn na een positieve 
reactie die zelf-consistent is, observers die minder positief zijn en targets na een 
reactie die niet overeenkomt met hun zelfbeeld het minst positief zijn. Beide target 
groepen verschillen van de observer groep, wat aangeeft dat vleierij zowel positieve 
als negatieve gevolgen kan hebben, afhankelijk van hoe compatible het is met 
iemands zelfbeeld.   
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